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Introduction
On the day Nelson Mandela was elected President of the newly demo-
cratic Republic of South Africa, a new constitution ended the most egre-
gious system of legal discrimination in the world: South African apartheid.
This past year marks the twentieth anniversary of South Africa’s transition
to democracy and the inauguration of the 1996 Constitution.  There has
been abundant exposure to South African constitutional law over the last
two decades because of admiration for its Bill of Rights, respect for the
South African Constitutional Court, and fascination with the nation’s com-
pelling history as a human rights state born out of radical inequality.
Scholars have paid particular attention to South Africa’s equality pro-
visions because of the country’s unique history.  Among the exceptional
elements of the South African Equality Clause is its novel and progressive
inclusion of anti-discrimination protections for lesbians and gay men.1
1. It is worth noting that this Article intentionally uses the terminology “gays and
lesbians” and “gay rights” rather than the more comprehensive term LGBTI (lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex) persons and rights.  The focus of this Article on
homosexuality to the exclusion of other sexual orientations (like bisexuality) or affili-
ated categories of discrimination (like gender identity discrimination), except where
those issues intersect with discrimination against gays and lesbians, is neither because
the discrimination and prejudice is any less severe nor the issues less compelling.  Nor is
the narrower focus because the South African Constitution does not prohibit discrimina-
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The prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation is particu-
larly important because it occurred— for the first time in any national con-
stitution— as a result of the closely-watched drafting of South Africa’s
historic “human rights” constitution.2  The South African Constitution
advanced the hopes of international gay rights advocates and set a bench-
mark for future constitutional drafters.  The drafters’ generous interpreta-
tion of contemporary human rights developments and their reformist
reading of international law precedents resulted in trail-blazing protections.
These advancements were supported by the moral authority of the South
African victory over apartheid and buttressed by the progressive creden-
tials of the activists who participated in (or publically affirmed) the consti-
tutional result.3
The promise of the Constitution’s equality protections was realized in
a sequence of highly visible legal victories for gays and lesbians.  Over the
last two decades, the Constitutional Court of South Africa decriminalized
same-sex sexual activity, required equal treatment of same-sex life partners
in immigration and government benefits law, and affirmed the fundamen-
tal validity of same-sex relationships, including recognition of full marriage
equality.  The Court’s opinions expressly affirmed the dignity and equality
of gays and lesbians in an unbroken series of unanimous, pro-gay deci-
sions.  The rulings decisively opposed discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation and established the present standards for a substantial portion of
the Constitutional Court’s broader equality jurisprudence.
Indeed, the South African gay rights jurisprudence exceeds the
broadest advancements of legal protections anywhere else in the world and
contrasts starkly with the appalling road taken by many countries, includ-
ing nearly every other sub-Saharan African country.4  However, court rul-
ings tell only a part of the story.  Although twenty years have passed since
tion on those additional bases; there is direct textual support that it does.  However, the
Constitutional Court has yet to decide a significant case applying the Equality Clause on
those more expanded bases and, indeed, the Court has made no substantive statements
about such discrimination in its first two decades.  I do not wish to contribute to the
further invisibility of bisexual, transgender, and intersex persons in the literature, but
for purposes of this particular Article, the absent elements of the Court’s jurisprudence
leave little to comment upon— other than the Court’s silence to date.  Further sociologi-
cal and legal research is needed to examine the impact and consequence of this absence.
2. Makua wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights
Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 65 (1997) (“[T]he first deliberate and calculated
effort in history to craft a human rights state— a polity that is primarily animated by
human rights norms.”).
3. See Tom Lodge, The Interplay of Non-Violent and Violent Action in the Movement
against Apartheid in South Africa, 1983– 1994, in CIVIL RESISTANCE AND POWER POLITICS:
THE EXPERIENCE OF NON-VIOLENT ACTION FROM GANDHI TO THE PRESENT 213, 227 (Adam
Roberts & Timothy Garton Ash eds., 2011).
4. See Kim Yi Dionne, Should we call Africa homophobic?, WASH. POST (July 10,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/07/10/why-im-
not-calling-africa-homophobic-anymore/. See generally LAW LIBRARY OF CONG., GLOB.
LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., LAWS ON HOMOSEXUALITY IN AFRICA (2014), http://www.loc.gov/
law/help/criminal-laws-on-homosexuality/homosexuality-laws-in-african-nations.pdf
(summarizing the treatment of homosexuality in the criminal laws of forty-nine African
nations).
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the Equality Clause prohibited sexual orientation discrimination, its practi-
cal effect has been markedly inadequate to achieve the safety and social
equality of LGBT persons in South Africa.  In sharp contrast to the Consti-
tution’s expansive textual protections and progressive jurisprudence, South
African gays and lesbians, particularly in poorer communities, routinely
experience condemnation, discrimination, and homophobic violence.
Hence, the Equality Clause is a symbol of both the progressive aims of the
post-apartheid constitution and the appalling gulf between those aspira-
tions and reality.
Examining the historical achievements and failures of the Constitu-
tion’s sexual orientation protections highlights larger lessons from the last
twenty years of constitutionalism in South Africa.  In this Article, I use the
drafting history, Constitutional Court adjudication, and the practical insuf-
ficiencies of the Constitution’s inclusion of sexual orientation-based pro-
tections to highlight three categories of insights.  These lessons include an
encouraging insight regarding the inclusion of novel and progressive ele-
ments when drafting modern constitutions; some modest claims about the
capacity of courts to combat inequality based on sexual orientation despite
the limitations of purely legal victories; and a hopeful affirmation of the
value of even unrealized constitutional aspirations for the fields of compar-
ative constitutionalism and gay and lesbian equality.
I. The Path to Constitutional Sexual Orientation Protections
A. The Rise of Post-Apartheid Constitutionalism in South Africa
In the early 1990s South Africa achieved a goal considered impossible
throughout long decades of oppressive, state-sponsored racism: a relatively
nonviolent transition from “racial autocracy to a nonracial democracy by
means of a negotiated transition, the progressive implementation of democ-
racy, and respect for fundamental human rights.”5  The antithesis of
apartheid, equality and human dignity were core values in the democratic
transition and were therefore prominently placed and repeatedly affirmed
in both of South Africa’s transitional constitutions.
1. Negotiating a Democratic Constitution for Post-Apartheid South Africa
The initial dispute between the dominant political parties at the 1991
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (“CODESA”) focused on the pro-
cess for drafting the constitution.6  Was the purpose of CODESA to draft a
minimal constitutional outline that would merely facilitate the democratic
election of a popularly-elected body empowered to draft a full constitution?
5. Albie Sachs, Constitutional Developments in South Africa, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 695, 695 (1996). See generally A Brief History of the African National Congress,
AFRICAN NAT’L CONG., http://www.anc.org.za/content/brief-history-anc (last visited Sept.
20, 2016) (detailing the history of the African National Congress in South Africa since
the mid-1800s).
6. ALLISTER SPARKS, TOMORROW IS ANOTHER COUNTRY: THE INSIDE STORY OF SOUTH
AFRICA’S ROAD TO CHANGE 133 (1995).
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Or, were the party-appointed CODESA delegates empowered to negotiate
all the terms of the nascent constitution?  The popular, newly unbanned
African National Congress (“ANC”) wanted to constrain CODESA’s author-
ity as much as possible so that the new constitution would be drafted by a
newly elected (and sure-to-be ANC-dominated) Parliament.7  The incum-
bent, white-minority National Party (“NP”) wanted CODESA to write an
entire constitution, leveraging their suddenly-diminishing power to protect
the white minority through codification of group rights, protection from
prosecution for apartheid-era actions, and clauses preserving the economic
status quo.8  These diametrically opposed visions of the CODESA process
and the atmosphere of suspicion surrounding it were substantial enough
that CODESA discussions collapsed in mid-1992 without producing a new
constitution.9  Significant concessions by both parties permitted the draft-
ers to resume work approximately a year later through a renamed drafting
conference called the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (“MPNP”).10  The
compromise, a two-part solution to the over-arching procedural problem,
included a two-stage drafting process and the formation of a constitutional
court that would have authority to enforce the parties’ negotiated
agreement.11
The first of the two negotiated stages of the transition involved draft-
ing a modest, temporary constitution (the “Interim Constitution”) and
holding South Africa’s first democratic elections.12  The freshly elected
members of the Interim Constitution’s new Parliament would then select a
new president.  In the second stage of the transition, the task of crafting the
full, final constitution (the “1996 Constitution”)13 was assigned to the
newly elected Parliament and Senate in their ancillary role as the Constitu-
tional Assembly.14
Two safeguards linked the two stages of this carefully-crafted process.
First, a set of thirty-four binding constitutional principles (“the Thirty-Four
7. PATTI WALDMEIR, ANATOMY OF A MIRACLE: THE END OF APARTHEID AND THE BIRTH OF
THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA 202 (1997) (providing general histories of the political transfor-
mation of South Africa at the end of the apartheid era).
8. Id. See generally SPARKS, supra note 6 (detailing the negotiating process that led
to majority rule).
9. See Dawid van Wyk, Introduction to the South African Constitution, in RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM, THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 131, 139 (Dawid van Wyk et
al. eds., 1994).
10. Id. at 140.
11. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, ch. 7, § 98(1).  Nelson Mandela originally pro-
posed the two-stage drafting process one year prior to the start of CODESA.  President
de Klerk tacitly approved it at CODESA’s inaugural session, and it was formalized over
the course of CODESA. See WALDMEIR, supra note 7, at 194– 95.
12. See SPARKS, supra note 6, at 134– 35.
13. S. AFR. CONST., 1996.  It is, of course, a bit of a misnomer to refer to the 1996
Constitution as the final constitution.  The “final” Constitution has been amended sev-
enteen times since its completion in December 1996, although none are directly relevant
to this Article.  For a complete list of amendments to the Constitution, see Amendments
to the Constitution, S. AFR. GOV’T, www.gov.za/documents/constitution-amendments
(last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
14. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, sched. 4; HASSEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL OF A
NATION: CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA 177, 180 (1998).
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Principles”) was agreed upon by the MPNP parties and attached to the
Interim Constitution as Schedule 4.15  The Thirty-Four principles were
intended to guide and constrain the choices made by the later drafters of
the final constitution.  Second, a constitutional court was created under the
Interim Constitution to “certify” that any subsequent constitution con-
formed to the negotiated agreement preserved in the Thirty-Four
Principles.16
This initial drafting period, including CODESA and the MPNP, lasted
nearly two years.  The Interim Constitution, with its thoroughly negotiated
Thirty-Four Principles, was agreed to on November 17, 1993.17  The provi-
sions of the Interim Constitution— with its Bill of Rights including protec-
tions with regard to sexual orientation— came into effect on the first day of
South Africa’s first multiracial elections, April 26, 1994.18  The results of
the election were particularly important given the elected parliamentary
members’ additional role as drafters of the Constitution that would replace
the Interim Constitution.  After three days of voting, South Africa’s first
democratic elections gave the ANC 62.7% of the National Assembly and
made Nelson Mandela the President of the Republic of South Africa.19
The elected members of the National Assembly and the Senate, in their
additional role as the Constitutional Assembly, formally began working on
the final Constitution in May 1994.20  Under the terms of the Interim Con-
stitution, the Constitutional Assembly had a mandated two-year timeframe
to complete this task.21  The drafting work was conducted primarily in
small, confidential Theme Committees rather than in large, public ses-
sions.22  The Committees held hearings; analyzed submissions from politi-
cal parties, private organizations, and citizens; and identified areas of
agreement and disagreement.23  The Theme Committees regularly reported
findings and made recommendations to the Constitutional Assembly as a
whole, but the core of the decision-making process occurred at the Consti-
15. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, sched. 4.
16. Id. at ch. 7; Albie Sachs, South Africa’s Unconstitutional Constitution, 41 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 1249, 1255 (1997).
17. LOURENS DU PLESSIS & HUGH CORDER, UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA’S TRANSI-
TIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 2– 17 (1994).
18. Andrew Reynolds, The Results, in ELECTION ‘94 SOUTH AFRICA: THE CAMPAIGN,
RESULTS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 182, 184– 87 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 1994).
19. South Africa’s democratic elections were held over several days beginning on
April 26, 1994.  Despite allegations of fraud and ballot tampering, the results (outside
KwaZulu-Natal) conformed with expectations to a significant degree: the ANC received a
strong but not overly dominant 62.7%, the NP received a disappointing 20.4%, the Zulu-
nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party won the KwaZulu-Natal Province, and the extremist
parties on both the left and right received only marginal percentages. Id. at 182– 83.
20. Jeremy Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa’s Final Constitution from a Human-
Rights Perspective, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 69 (1999).
21. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, ch. 5, § 73.
22. Theme Committees were identified by number and had the following foci: (1)
character of state, (2) structure of state, (3) relations between levels of government, (4)
fundamental rights, (5) judiciary and legal systems, and (6) specialized structures. See
Sarkin, supra note 20, at 70 n.23 (1999).
23. Id. at 70.
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tutional Committee, the authoritative party-based negotiating body of the
Constitutional Assembly.24
Additionally, the Constitutional Assembly launched an ambitious pro-
gram to educate the public about the constitution and to engage South Afri-
cans in the drafting process: The Public Participation Programme.  The
Public Participation Programme “recognized the fundamental significance
of a [c]onstitution in the lives of citizens” and ostensibly “sought to place
public participation at the centre of the [c]onstitution-making process.”25
The Programme was meant to invite citizen involvement in the constitu-
tional process and thereby to increase the constitution’s popular legiti-
macy.26  The Programme held in-person informational sessions,
distributed booklets related to the process (and later, the proposed text),
and facilitated the submission of public commentary about the constitu-
tion.27  Over the course of the Programme, the Constitutional Assembly
received more than two million submissions from citizens and domestic
groups.28
24. The Constitutional Committee was comprised of members of the seven political
parties represented in Parliament in proportion to the number of seats they held in the
National Assembly: The African National Congress (252 seats in Parliament), the
National Party (82 seats), the IFP (43 seats), the Democratic Party (7 seats), the Free-
dom Front (9 seats), the Pan African Congress (5 seats), and the African Christian Dem-
ocratic Party (2 seats). See Reynolds, supra note 18, at 183.
25. Eric C. Christiansen, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet: Sexual Orientation in the
South African Constitutional Process, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 997, 1007 (2000) [here-
inafter Christiansen, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet] (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also EBRAHIM, supra note 14, at 239– 50 (detailing the successes of
the Public Participation Programme in engaging the public).
26. As the media releases from the Constitutional Assembly described it: “The final
submission was hand-delivered to the Constitutional Assembly at 11:30pm and at mid-
night the fax lines were still humming as the country’s greatest ever public participation
campaign came to a close [on February 20, 1996].” CONSTITUTIONAL TALK: OFFICIAL
NEWSL. CONST. ASSEMBLY (Constitutional Assembly, Rep. of S. Afr.), vol. 2, 1996 [herein-
after CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2].  Participation in all aspects of the program exceeded
expectations. See CONSTITUTIONAL TALK: OFFICIAL NEWSL. CONST. ASSEMBLY (Constitu-
tional Assembly, Rep. of S. Afr.), vol. 9, June 30, 1995 [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL TALK,
vol. 9].
27. Sarkin, supra note 20, at 72.
28. Submissions in phase one totaled 1.8 million, and submissions in phase two
totaled 250,000. See CONSTITUTIONAL TALK: OFFICIAL NEWSL. CONST. ASSEMBLY (Constitu-
tional Assembly, Rep. of S. Afr.), vol. 8, June 8, 1995 [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL TALK,
vol. 8].  Additionally, over 80,000 people attended public meetings and constitutional
education workshops sponsored by the Assembly throughout the country. CONSTITU-
TIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra note 26.  While there were complaints that the program was
not fully effective at reaching rural communities, informal settlements, women, and eld-
erly citizens, a 1996 independent survey found that the media campaign had reached
18.5 million people, an impressive 73% of adult South Africans.  The survey was con-
ducted by the Community Agency for Social Equality. CONSTITUTIONAL TALK: OFFICIAL
NEWSL. CONST. ASSEMBLY (Constitutional Assembly, Rep. of S. Afr.), vol. 3, Apr. 22, 1996.
Over four million copies of a special thirty-two-page Constitutional Talk edition were
produced in all eleven official languages.  The publication contained the complete text of
the draft Constitution, explanatory articles outlining the issues, and a series of graphics
aimed at making the often complex constitutional issues accessible to ordinary South
Africans.  See CONSTITUTIONAL TALK: OFFICIAL NEWSL. CONST. ASSEMBLY (Constitutional
Assembly, Rep. of S. Afr.), vol. 1, Feb. 9, 1996 [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 1].
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The Constitutional Assembly adopted the 1996 Constitution by an
overwhelming majority: 80 of 90 Senators and 321 of 400 National Assem-
bly members voted in favor of the proposed final text.29  This was signifi-
cantly greater than the requisite two-thirds majority of the entire
Constitutional Assembly.30  The proposed constitution, however, could not
be signed by the President or come into force until the Constitutional
Court “certified” it.31
As a result of the compromise that allowed South Africa’s first demo-
cratic elections, the Interim Constitution’s Thirty-Four Principles estab-
lished “the fundamental guidelines, the prescribed boundaries, according
to which and within which the [Constitutional Assembly] was obliged to
perform its drafting function.”32  The Constitutional Court was required to
declare that the proposed text complied with each of the Thirty-Four Prin-
ciples annexed to the Interim Constitution.33  The expansiveness of the
proposed Equality Clause text was one of the many elements challenged
when the Certification Case came before the Constitutional Court.34  The
Court rejected the challenge and the Equality Clause, which included the
world’s first express sexual orientation protections, remained in the 1996
Constitution.35
2. Sexual Orientation and the Post-Apartheid Constitutions
Broadly enforceable equality rights were a legal refutation of
apartheid-era discrimination and a substantiation of ANC claims that post-
apartheid South Africa would be based on “non-racialism.”  As the end of
apartheid approached, the formerly banned ANC had to codify its policies
and protest statements into constitutional rights text.  Hence, even before
Mandela was released from prison or the ban on the ANC lifted, the 1989
ANC publication Constitutional Guidelines for a New South Africa asserted
the need for a justiciable Bill of Rights in a post-apartheid South Africa:
“The Constitution shall include a Bill of Rights based on the Freedom
29. Sarkin, supra note 20, at 72.
30. The Constitutional Assembly consisted of the four hundred newly elected mem-
bers of the National Assembly and the ninety members of the Senate. REP. OF S. AFR.,
DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, vol. 3, at 447– 52, 524– 25 (1996).
31. See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, ch. 5, § 71(2) (“The new constitutional text
passed by the Constitutional Assembly, or any provision thereof, shall not be of any
force and effect unless the Constitutional Court has certified that all the provisions of
such text comply with the [Thirty-Four] Constitutional Principles . . . .”); Certification of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at 21 para. 32 (S.
Afr.) (“It is necessary to underscore again that the basic certification exercise involves
measuring the [final constitutional text] against the [Thirty-Four Principles]”); Certifica-
tion of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at 12 para. 17
(“[C]ertification mean[t] a good deal more than merely checking off each individual
provision of the [final text] against the several [Principles]”).
32. Certification of the Constitution 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at 21 para. 32 (S. Afr.).
33. Id. at 1– 3, 8– 13, 18– 21 paras. 1– 4, 12– 19, 26– 31.
34. Id. at 61– 64 paras. 96– 103.
35. Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Con-
stitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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Charter.[36]  Such a Bill of Rights shall guarantee the fundamental human
rights of all citizens . . . and shall provide appropriate mechanisms for their
enforcement.”37  The ANC produced more fully developed Bill of Rights
drafts in 199038 and again in 1992.39  To a significant degree, the civil and
political rights outlined in those two ANC documents formed the ideologi-
cal core of the Interim Constitution’s Bill of Rights.  Equality was a central
element of all four documents.
Surprisingly, the ruling white-minority NP was, like the ANC, explor-
ing options for a Bill of Rights prior to the formal end of apartheid.40  Not
only were both of the main parties to the initial constitutional negotiations
on similar timelines, but there were certain congruencies in the core ele-
ments of their proposals: protection of individual rights, limits on govern-
ment power, and independent judicial oversight.41  Among the similarities
were enforceable equality protections to ensure non-discriminatory state
action.42  By the time the Interim Constitution negotiations began, every
major political party agreed that the final document would include a Bill of
Rights with a substantial Equality Clause.43
36. Adopted by the 3,000-delegate Congress of the People on June 26, 1955, the
ANC-authored Freedom Charter was the political manifesto of the anti-apartheid move-
ment.  In addition to the core tenet of multi-racialism, the document also emphasized
redistribution of wealth, land ownership by those who work it, equal protection of the
law, and other social and economic rights.  It was the ANC’s primary statement of values
throughout most of its history and has been retroactively labeled a proto-Bill of Rights.
For full text of the Charter, see The Freedom Charter, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249,
249 (1989).
37. CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA (1989), reprinted in
21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 237 (1989).  The Guidelines were the subject of exten-
sive review and critique in South Africa.  Albie Sachs, A Bill of Rights for South Africa:
Areas of Agreement and Disagreement, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 13, 17 (1990)
(“Indeed, so many bodies have taken up, analysed, and criticised the Guidelines that
they have ceased to be simply an ANC document; instead they have become a working
text for the entire anti-apartheid movement.”).
38. See CONSTITUTIONAL COMM., AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS: A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR A
DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA— WORKING DRAFT FOR CONSULTATION (1990), reprinted in 18
SOC. JUST. 49, 49 (1991).
39. See CONSTITUTIONAL COMM., ANC DRAFT BILL OF RIGHTS: A PRELIMINARY REVISED
TEXT (1992), reprinted in ALBIE SACHS, ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 215
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 ANC DRAFT BILL OF RIGHTS].
40. See S. AFRICAN LAW COMM’N, WORKING PAPER NO. 25, PROJECT 58: GROUP AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1989), reprinted in The South African Law Commission Bill of Rights, 21
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 241, 241 (1990) [hereinafter WORKING PAPER NO. 25]; Lynn
Berat, A New South Africa?: Prospects for an Africanist Bill of Rights and a Transformed
Judiciary, 13 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 467, 468 (1991).
41. Christiansen, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 25, at 1014.
42. Edwin Cameron, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Test Case for Human
Rights, 110 S. AFR. L.J. 450, 450– 51 (1993) [hereinafter Cameron, Sexual Orientation
and the Constitution] (noting these shared characteristics).
43. See generally DU PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note 17.  This book’s authors were the
primary drafters of the interim Bill of Rights. See also Letter from Albie Sachs, Justice,
Constitutional Court of South Africa, to Author (Jan. 7, 2000) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Letter from Albie Sachs].
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a. Interim Constitution Drafting Period
Gay and lesbian advocacy groups, which had worked to include sexual
orientation protections in the early Bill of Rights proposals, continued their
education and lobbying campaigns during the Interim Constitution draft-
ing period.  The success of the work of gay community activists was evi-
dent at the May 1992 ANC National Conference.  Sexual orientation was
mentioned twice in the party’s formal policy guidelines.44  It became offi-
cial ANC policy that “the right not to be discriminated against or subjected
to harassment because of sexual orientation” would be included in any
new constitution’s bill of rights.45  Additionally, under “basic principles”
related to social welfare policies, the document stated a goal of “full
employment with a rising standard of living and quality of social and work-
ing life for all South Africans, regardless of race, sex, class, religion, creed,
sexual orientation[,] and physical or mental disability.”46  Notably, this
proposal’s list of prohibited grounds for discrimination is very similar to
the prohibited grounds in the Interim Constitution’s Equality Clause, fur-
ther highlighting the value of early lobbying efforts.47
Once the failed CODESA project was resurrected at the MPNP, the
various political parties made their policies more explicit.  The NP’s Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights, adopted as government policy in 1992 (and
representing the NP’s Bill of Rights proposal for the Interim Constitution),
prohibited anti-gay discrimination by declaring that sexual orientation fell
within the “other natural characteristics” against which discrimination was
forbidden in its proposed non-discrimination clause.48  The ANC explicitly
included “sexual orientation” in their 1992 draft Bill of Rights.49  The
44. Christiansen, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 25, at 1029.
45. Policy Documents, African National Congress, Ready to Govern: ANC Policy
Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa as Adopted at the National Conference, AFRICAN
NAT’L CONG., § B.5 [hereinafter Ready to Govern].
46. Id. § L.1.
47. See S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, ch. 3, § 8(2) (declaring that age, language,
and culture are all included).  As their work with the ANC began to yield results, gay and
lesbian activists began lobbying other parties as well.  In June 1991, the Organisation for
Lesbian and Gay Action contacted ten political parties and questioned them about their
policy regarding general Bill of Rights protections of individual rights and the specific
inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected category.  Only the Democratic Party
responded affirmatively to the question of explicit protections for gays and lesbians:
“The Bill of Rights will guarantee all persons irrespective of . . . sexual preference . . . the
following fundamental rights . . . [including] [e]qual protection of the law . . . .” See
Derrick Fine & Julia Nicol, The Lavender Lobby: Working for Lesbian and Gay Rights
Within the Liberation Movement, in DEFIANT DESIRE 269, 273 (Mark Gevisser & Edwin
Cameron eds., 1995).  The National Party and Labour Party committed only to general
protections of individual rights, the Conservative Party stated a Bill of Rights was unnec-
essary because “the Ten Commandments serve as the best Bill of Rights and all rights
are sufficiently enshrined therein,” and six other parties neglected to respond. Id.
48. This language was proposed by the National Party on February 2, 1993. See
Edwin Cameron, ‘Unapprehended Felons’: Gays and Lesbians and the Law in South Africa,
in DEFIANT DESIRE, supra note 47, at 89, 94– 95 [hereinafter Cameron, Unapprehended
Felons].
49. “It shall be unlawful to discriminate on the grounds of gender, single
parenthood, legitimacy of birth or sexual orientation.”  1992 ANC DRAFT BILL OF RIGHTS,
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Democratic Party submission, following the policy it had previously
reported, expressly outlawed direct and indirect discrimination based on
sexual orientation.50  Even the Inkatha Freedom Party, the dominant
regional party from KwaZulu-Natal, expressly prohibited such discrimina-
tion in its proposal: “All citizens . . . have equal social dignity, shall be
equal before the law[,] and shall share an equal right of access to political,
social, and economic opportunities irrespective of . . . sexual orienta-
tion . . . .”51  Although other, less significant parties did not include sexual
orientation protections in their Bill of Rights proposals, either explicit or
implicit protections were favored by parties that would go on to win 95.2%
of the vote in the 1994 elections set up under the Interim Constitution.52
The inclusion of some form of sexual orientation protections in the
dominant parties’ draft Bills of Rights marked a tremendous accomplish-
ment,53 but it did not ensure inclusion of reference to sexual orientation in
the Interim Constitution.  By the time of the MPNP, it remained unclear
within the Technical Committee for Fundamental Rights whether the
Equality Clause would take the form of a provision prohibiting discrimina-
tion against specific, enumerated classes (“No discrimination on the basis
of race, religion, sex, etc.”) or a generic non-discrimination provision (“No
supra note 39, art. 7(2); see also Ready to Govern, supra note 45, §§ B.5, J.1 (listing
among protected rights in the introduction to the Bill of Rights, “the right not to be
discriminated against or subjected to harassment because of sexual orientation,” and, in
the education, training, and scientific developments section, affirming “all individuals
should have access to lifelong education and training, irrespective of . . . sexual
orientation”).
50. The Democratic Party proposal stated:
[Art.] 2.1  Every person shall have the right to equal treatment, and there shall
consequently be no discrimination, whether direct or indirect.
[Art.] 2.2  Discrimination means unjustified differentiation.  Differentiation on
the grounds of race, ethnic origin, colour, gender, sexual orientation, age, disa-
bility, religion, creed[,] or conscience shall be presumed unjustified unless it is
part of a rational programme intended to remedy substantial inequality.
DEMOCRATIC PARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THE RULE OF LAW: ADVANCING LIBERTY IN THE NEW
SOUTH AFRICA: DEMOCRATIC PARTY DRAFT BILL OF RIGHTS, MAY 1993, at 1 (1993).
51. Other protected classifications included sex, race, colour, language, traditions,
creed, religion, political affiliation and belief, and social and personal status. See
KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, Resolution: Constitution of the State of KwaZulu/Natal
§ 10(a) Equality (Dec. 1, 1992), quoted in Cameron, Unapprehended Felons, supra note
48, at 96.
52. In the 1994 elections, the ANC received 62.6% of the popular vote, the NP
received 20.4%, the IFP received 10.5%, and the DP received 1.7%.  Combined, they
contributed 95.9% of the members of the Constitutional Assembly (384 of 400 mem-
bers). See Reynolds, supra note 18, at 183.
53. In an appeal to a 1993 sodomy conviction, S v. H, then judge (now Constitution
Court Justice) Ackermann, while upholding a conviction for private, consensual sex
between men, lessened the imposed sentence.  Citing the various drafts of the then-
pending Interim Constitution, the judge identified a “broad consensus on eliminating
discrimination against homosexuality and the likelihood that this will be entrenched in
a new constitutional dispensation.” Voris Johnson, Making Words on a Page Become Eve-
ryday Life: A Strategy to Help Gay Men and Lesbians Achieve Full Equality under South
Africa’s Constitution, 11 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 583, 620 (1997) (citing State v. H. 1995 (1)
SA 120 (CPD) at 124 (S. Afr.)).
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discrimination.”).54  In the end, party negotiators chose to include the full
enumeration of prohibited bases of discrimination as submitted by the
Technical Committee.55  Persons familiar with that decision state that it
was motivated in part by the vulnerability of gays and lesbians under less
explicit or unenumerated Equality Clause formulations.56  This decision,
combined with the fact that the Technical Committee was producing an
extensive Bill of Rights draft (rather than a minimalist one), heightened the
importance of the earlier proposals of the parties; the already established
areas of agreement became presumptive elements of the constitutional
draft.  The result was expansive and express equality protections in the
Interim Constitution.
A historic, albeit potentially temporary, victory had been secured.
However, threats to the newfound protections awaited in the more public,
more strongly majoritarian final constitution drafting process.
b. Final Constitution Drafting Period
The path from inclusion in the Interim Constitution to retention in the
final 1996 Constitution was fairly straightforward for most portions of the
Equality Clause.57  There is insufficient evidence in the historical record to
state definitively how vulnerable sexual orientation protections were.  It is
evident from Constitutional Assembly documents that although only a sin-
gle party expressly opposed inclusion, the Assembly considered removing
explicit references to sexual orientation.58  As late as October 1995, inclu-
sion of sexual orientation as a protected class was still identified as a “con-
tentious and outstanding issue” in the working draft of the final
constitution.59  Indeed, a memorandum accompanying the November 22,
1995 working draft implied that sexual orientation protections were the
sole controversial and undecided element of the Equality Clause.60
54. See Letter from Albie Sachs, supra note 43.
55. Christiansen, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 25, at 1032.
56. See Letter from Albie Sachs, supra note 43.  The Committee was also influenced
by a written submission from the Equality Foundation, a pro-gay lobbying group. See
DU PLESSIS & CORDER, supra note 17, at 142.
57. No categories were dropped between the Interim Constitution and the final Con-
stitution; pregnancy, marital status, and birth were added. Compare S. AFR. (INTERIM)
CONST., 1993, ch. 3, § 8(2), with S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 9(3).
58. The most likely option would have been usage of language similar to the South
African Law Commission phrase “natural characteristics” or the International Conven-
tion on Civil and Political Rights “or other status” language. See International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, 26, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]; WORKING PAPER NO. 25, supra note 40.
59. See S. LIEBENBERG ET AL., TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THEME COMMITTEE FOUR, CON-
STITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA ON THE DRAFT BILL OF RIGHTS OF 9
OCTOBER 1995: OVERVIEW OF METHOD OF WORK 10– 12 [hereinafter EXPLANATORY
MEMORANDA].
60. “However, some people say that it is wrong to include sexual orientation as one
of the grounds for unfair discrimination.  They argue that homosexuals should not be
given this kind of protection in the new Constitution.” Equality and Discrimination, Edi-
torial Accompanying the Working Draft of the New Constitution, CONSTITUTION.ORG (Nov.
22, 1995), https://web.archive.org/web/19991108220224/http://www.constitution.org
.za/edit/equal.html.
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i. Technical Committee Support
The Constitutional Assembly’s Technical Committee of Theme Com-
mittee Four supported a broadly and expressly inclusive Equality Clause.61
Indeed, the committee discussed sexual orientation protections as a “uni-
versally accepted fundamental right” in its Explanatory Memoranda pre-
pared for the Constitutional Committee.62  This implied that South Africa
would be following the model of international law treaties or regional
human rights courts.  Inclusion of sexual orientation protections would be
more publically acceptable and politically achievable if it were a codifica-
tion of international human rights law rather than a South African innova-
tion.63  Hence, the Technical Committee demonstrated the similarity
between sexual orientation discrimination and other forms of proscribed
discrimination in human rights documents: “The enumerated grounds of
discrimination in international law relate to characteristics and choices
which are an integral part of human personality and identity.  They also
include attributes of groups which are particularly vulnerable to discrimi-
nation, exclusion[,] and subordination.”64
The Technical Committee also very favorably interpreted the four
cases decided prior to 1995 in which international human rights bodies
had identified “sexual orientation” as a category for protection:65
The UN Human Rights Committee has interpreted sex as a prohibited
ground of discrimination in articles 2(1) and article 26 of the [International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)] to include sexual orienta-
tion.[66]  Thus the Committee has ruled that legislation criminalising all
forms of sexual contact between consenting homosexual men to be in viola-
61. Theme Committee Four focused on fundamental rights in the final constitution.
See Jeremy Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa’s Final Constitution from a Human-Rights
Perspective, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 70 n.23 (1999).  Committee members are listed here:
List of People that Made up the Constitutional Assembly, S. AFR. HIST. ONLINE (Apr. 24,
2014), http://www.sahistory.org.za/list-people-made-constitutional-assembly.
62. See EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA, supra note 59, at 7, § 4.2.3.  This traces back to
the Thirty-Four Principles of the Interim Constitution.  Principle II stated that: “Every-
one shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liber-
ties . . . provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the
Constitution, which shall be drafted after having given due consideration to inter alia the
fundamental rights contained in Chapter 3 of this [Interim] Constitution.” S. AFR.
(INTERIM) CONST., 1993, art. 2, sched. 4.
63. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993, art. 2, sched. 4.
64. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA, supra note 59, at 10.
65. At the start of the constitutional drafting process, there had been only two such
cases.  See Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1991); Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20 (1981); AMNESTY INT’L, BREAK-
ING THE SILENCE: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION 21– 27, 29,
32– 41, 48– 49 (1997).
66. ICCPR, supra note 58, art. 26.  Article 26 states:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law.  In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, relig-
ion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth[,] or
other status.
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tion of the rights to privacy protected in article 17 of the Covenant read with
the right to non-discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights protected in
the Covenant.[67]  This is consistent with the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights.68
Even today, twenty years later, it is overly optimistic to read interna-
tional legal precedent as encompassing a blanket affirmation of gay and
lesbian equal rights.  While significant progress has been made, no for-
mally adopted international human rights documents explicitly include
protections of gays and lesbians or prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation.69  Indeed, the first formal intergovernmental discussion of
sexual orientation discrimination was not held until 2012.70
As further support for the inclusion of sexual orientation, the Techni-
cal Committee asserted:
[M]any countries and states have adopted anti-discrimination legislation
which either expressly, or through interpretation, have included sexual ori-
entation.  Thus, for example, in the Canadian case of Haig v Canada,[71] it
was held that sexual orientation should be treated as an analogous ground
of discrimination and thus included within the scope of [section three] of
the Canadian Human Rights Act.72
It must be acknowledged, that the use of the phrase “for example” was a bit
disingenuous here.  While it is true that anti-discrimination legislation that
includes sexual orientation was reasonably common in developed Western
countries by the mid-1990s, no country other than Canada had found that
gays and lesbians were an implicitly protected category under a national
constitution.73
Id.
67. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/
1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994) [hereinafter Toonen]. Toonen asserted
that the protection from discrimination based on “sex” in article 26 of the ICCPR was to
be interpreted as including sexual orientation. Id. at 3.  Advocates for gay rights had
also argued that sexual orientation was covered under “other status” in article 26, and
under the privacy provisions in article 17(1).  ICCPR, supra note 58, art. 26.
68. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA, supra note 59, at 7, § 4.2.3.  The referenced European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) cases are Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 63 (ruling that
the Northern Ireland law criminalizing homosexual acts violated article 8 of the Euro-
pean Convention for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which guarantees “eve-
ryone the right to respect for private and family life, his home[,] and his
correspondence”), Norris, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 196 (ruling that Ireland’s sodomy law
violated article 8 of the European Convention), and Modinos v. Cyprus, App. No.
15070/89, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485, 494 (1993) (applying Dudgeon and Norris holdings
to Republic of Cyprus). See generally AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 65.
69. See generally Michael O’Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual Orientation, Gender Iden-
tity and International Human Rights Law: Contextualising the Yogyakarta Principles, 8
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207, 217– 48 (2008).
70. U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R ON HUMAN RIGHTS, FACT SHEET: INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER IDENTITY (2012), http://www
.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Discrimination/LGBT/FactSheets/unfe-11-UN_Fact_
Sheets_GenderIdentity_English.pdf.
71. Haig v. Canada, [1993] S.C.R. 995, 997– 99 (Can.).
72. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA, supra note 59, at 7.
73. Christiansen, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 25, at 1036.
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In fact, by the time the Technical Committee drafted its memorandum,
only four favorable legal precedents related to the rights of gays and lesbi-
ans existed under international law.  In Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, Norris
v. Ireland, and Modinos v. Cyprus,74 the European Court of Human Rights
(“ECHR”) found that national sodomy laws were inconsistent with member
states’ obligations under Article Eight of the European Convention for
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.75  And, in Toonen v. Australia,
the United Nations Human Rights Commission provided a similar ruling
based on its classification of sexual orientation discrimination as a subset
of sex discrimination.76  When the South African Constitution was being
drafted those cases were very recent, atypical, and represented little with
regard to precedent.77
Nevertheless, the Technical Committee was unambiguous in its final
endorsement to the Constitutional Assembly: “[I]t is our strong recommen-
dation that sexual orientation be included as a prohibited ground of dis-
crimination in the [E]quality [C]lause.”78
ii. Gay and Lesbian Advocacy in the Final Drafting Period
A newly formed coalition of activists and organizations under the
name National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (“NCGLE”) spon-
sored the gay and lesbian community’s most evident efforts to influence
the final text of the 1996 Constitution.79  NCGLE’s primary focus was on
74. Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1991); Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20 (1981).
75. Laurence Helfer, Finding a Consensus on Equality: The Homosexual Age of Consent
and the European Convention on Human Rights, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1044, 1045– 1100
(1990).
76. Toonen, supra note 67, at 226, 235.
77. Additionally, the ECHR cases are applicable only to the forty-seven Council of
Europe member states.  And, enforcement has been notoriously problematic: after Modi-
nos, Cyprus refused to change its discriminatory laws for several years.  Moreover,
Toonen was a very limited holding that is open to a variety of interpretations.  Its reli-
ance upon continued judicial assignment of sexual orientation rights to clauses prohib-
iting discrimination based on “sex” has been questioned.  Additionally, enforcement of
the Commission ruling was very challenging, requiring Australia to invoke its “foreign
relations power” and sue the province of Tasmania before the provincial legislature
changed their law. See Douglas Sanders et al., Finding a Place in International Law, INT’L
GAY & LESBIAN ASS’N (July 20, 1997), http://dossieractivista.no.sapo.pt/place_interna
tional_law.htm.
Very few international human rights bodies have evidenced the kind of unequivocal
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as the Technical Com-
mittee read into contemporary precedent.  International law, at its best, has been incon-
sistent. See O’Flaherty & Fisher, supra note 69, at 228; see also AMNESTY INT’L, supra note
65, at 38– 39.
78. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA, supra note 59, at 10, § 6.1.
79. See CARL F. STYCHIN, A NATION BY RIGHTS: NATIONAL CULTURES, SEXUAL IDENTITY
POLITICS, AND THE DISCOURSE OF RIGHTS 74– 75 (1988).  Based in Johannesburg, NCGLE
was formed in December 1994 in anticipation of the struggle to keep sexual orientation
in the final Constitution’s non-discrimination clause.  It coordinated national efforts on
behalf of a loose association of seventy-three member organizations.  NCGLE’s activities
were meant to supplement the continued activities of the other South African gay and
lesbian groups.  Christiansen, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 25, at 1037
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-3\CIN302.txt unknown Seq: 16 13-APR-17 15:43
580 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 49
lobbying to senior Constitutional Assembly decision-makers.80  Seconda-
rily it sought to influence the Public Participation Programme, hoping to
demonstrate popular support to maintain explicit sexual orientation pro-
tections in the final constitution.81  During the drafting period, NCGLE’s
work included coordinating Coalition member actions, organizing lobby-
ing efforts that reflected the racial and linguistic diversity of gay and les-
bian South Africans, preparing submissions to the Constitutional
Assembly, and orchestrating pro-gay letter-writing, petitions, and postcard
campaigns.82  Following the coming into force of the 1996 Constitution,
NCGLE also inaugurated its very successful litigation strategy, which will
be discussed later in this Article.83
iii. Organized Opposition to Sexual Orientation Protections
It should be acknowledged at the outset of this discussion of formal
opposition that the Public Participation Programme and outside studies of
general population attitudes toward homosexuality in South Africa in the
1990s reflect significant antipathy toward gays and lesbians.84  However,
only one political party, the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP),85
formally fought inclusion of sexual orientation protections in the final con-
stitution.86  The party based its opposition on a call for all political deci-
sions to reflect the party’s interpretation of biblical values.87  According to
(citing Bob Drogin, South Africa Gays Chalk Up New Rights to Nation’s Cruel History;
During Blacks’ Struggle, Homosexual Activists Got Support from Anti-Apartheid Leaders.
Constitution Now Protects Them from Bias, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1996, at A5).
80. Jacklyn Cock, Engendering Gay and Lesbian Rights: The Equality Clause in the
South African Constitution, 26 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 35, 37 (2003).
81. See STYCHIN, supra note 79.
82. Press Release, Int’l Gay & Lesbian Human Rights Comm’n, Historic South Afri-
can Bill of Rights Includes Sexual Orientation (May 1, 1996), http://www.qrd.org/qrd/
world/africa/south_africa/constitution.includes.sexual.orienatation-05.01.96.
83. See infra Sections III.A and III.B for discussion of the primary cases supported by
NCGLE.
84. David Bilchitz, Constitutional Change and Participation of LGBTI Groups: A case
study in South Africa, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE 1, 13 (2015),
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/constitutional-change-and-participation-of-lgbti-
groups-a-case-study-of-south-africa-pdf.pdf.
85. The ACDP, the smallest party in the Constitutional Assembly, was founded in
1994 by Kenneth Meshoe, a Christ for All Nations evangelical minister claiming an
instruction from his god to found a political party based on “biblical values.” Reverend
Kenneth Meshoe’s Testimony, AFR. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, http://www.acdp.org.za/
faq_testimony.asp (last visited June 28, 2000); see also PAUL STOBER & BARBARA LUDMAN,
A-Z OF SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS 224 (Paul Stobler & Barbara Ludman eds., 2005) [here-
inafter STOBER].
86. One of the twelve reasons the ACDP opposed the final Constitutions states: “The
ACDP rejects the horizontal application of the equality clause [sic] in Chapter 2 of the
Bill of Rights.  We do not want Gays and Lesbians who are protected by the ‘sexual
orientation’ clause in subsection 9(3) to be imposed on us.  We want the right not to
employ them, if we so wish, and not to have them teach our children their immoral,
unnatural[,] and sinful lifestyles.” 12 Reasons Why the ACDP Voted Against the Adoption
on the South African Constitution, IAFRICA, http://users.iafrica.com/a/ac/acdp/constit
.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2016).
87. See Gustavo Gomes da Costa Santos, Decriminalising homosexuality in Africa:
lessons from the South African experience, in HUMAN RIGHTS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
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the ACDP, inclusion of anti-discrimination protection for gays and lesbians
was “against the will of God and African culture.”88
Furthermore, in its attempts to persuade the Constitutional Assembly
to remove sexual orientation protections, the ACDP asserted that inclusion
of sexual orientation in the Equality Clause amounted to special rights.89
The party also raised the specters of mandated same-sex marriage90 and
exposure of children to “immoral, unnatural[,] and sinful lifestyles.”91
Although the ACDP was the smallest political party in the Constitutional
Assembly— having won only two out of four hundred seats in the National
Assembly in the 1994 elections92— support for its conservative positions
was far greater than its electoral results indicated.93  Indeed, significant
numbers of religious conservatives opposed the inclusion of sexual orien-
tation protections even though they were politically aligned with parties,
such as the ANC, who supported it.94
Nevertheless, other than the ACDP and some conservative religious
groups, there was very limited formal or institutional opposition to the
inclusion of sexual orientation during the drafting of the final constitu-
tion.95  But there was significant evidence of unfavorable public sentiment,
in the form of petitions received through the Constitutional Assembly’s
Public Participation Programme.96
iv. Sexual Orientation in the Public Participation Programme
The various elements of the final constitution’s drafting process were
all occurring simultaneously.  While the Theme Committees were drafting
proposed text, elected representatives were expressing their public posi-
tions and party elites were negotiating the most sensitive outcomes, popu-
GENDER IDENTITY IN THE COMMONWEALTH 313, 313– 34 (Corinne Lennox & Matthew
Waites eds., 2013).
88. Constitutional Talk, vol. 1, supra note 26.
89. According to the ACDP, inclusion of sexual orientation as a protected category
yields “preferential protection” that is open to all sorts of abuses including “the right to
homosexuality, bestiality, pedophilia[,] and other ‘perverse sexual activity.’” CONSTITU-
TIONAL TALK, vol. 8, supra note 26.
90. For example: “What people do not realise is that this clause puts us priests in a
lot of trouble . . . .  What it means is that if two people of the same sex come to my
church and ask me to marry them, if I refuse on grounds that they are of the same sex,
they have recourse to the law . . . .  We have to test the will of the people on this
issue . . . .  And I am sure the majority of our people would not allow such marriages to
be legalised.  This is against the will of God and African culture.” Id.
91. Id.
92. See Reynolds, supra note 18, at 183.
93. See STYCHIN, supra note 79, at 80.
94. At the May 1995 National Sector Public Hearing for Religious Groups, several
religious leaders declared that the sexual orientation clause was not necessary as there
was sufficient protection in other rights.  Mr. Mokabane of Concerned Evangelicals and
Rev. Steele, of the International Fellowship of Christian Churches, spoke against inclu-
sion of protections for gays and lesbians, reciting arguments similar to the ACDP party
position.  The general focus of the meeting was on church-state issues and rights of free
exercise.  Christiansen, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 25, at 1039– 40.
95. See STOBER, supra note 85.
96. Christiansen, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 25, at 1039– 40.
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lar input was also being sought.97  And, debate over inclusion of sexual
orientation protections in the final constitution figured prominently in the
Public Participation Programme.98  Sexual orientation protections were
identified as a “hot topic” early in the process.  In fact, retention of sexual
orientation in the Equality Clause was mentioned in over 800 of the indi-
vidual public comments and in petitions bearing over 24,000 signatures.99
A significant majority of individual submissions in the Programme sup-
ported inclusion— perhaps as a result of the efforts of NCGLE— but petition
signatures gathered by conservative churches advocated removal of protec-
tions by more than a two-to-one margin over signatories supporting
retention.100
Very few of the Programme’s public submissions are lengthy or
thoughtful.  Most are in the form of petitions or follow a common script.
Submissions in support of inclusion followed certain trends.  Most sup-
porters wanted to “keep sexual orientation in the Constitution,” expressing
approval for the protective status quo created by the Interim Constitu-
tion.101  To the extent that the writers expressed a reason for inclusion,
they most often cited general anti-discrimination arguments:102 “Discrimi-
nation for one means discrimination for all, we cannot have a truly demo-
cratic society when any section of the population is discriminated
against”;103 and, “I don’t work any different, I don’t sleep any different, I
97. Thabo Mbeki, Representative ANC of South Africa, Statement at the General
Assembly of the U.N. (Dec. 13, 1993), https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index
.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02103/05lv02117/06lv02118.htm; see also Chapter 10 –  A
Framework for Negotiating the Final Constitution, S. AFR. HIST. ONLINE, http://www.sahis
tory.org.za/archive/chapter-10-framework-negotiating-final-constitution (last visited
Sept. 11, 2016).
98. The Programme can be divided into two separate public comment periods, one
from formation of the Constitutional Assembly in May 1994 until mid-1995 and another
from publication of the working draft in November 1995 until February 20, 1996.  In the
period of response to the working draft alone, 56% of the total comments addressed
articles of the Bill of Rights. See CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra note 26.
99. This total is based on figures reported by the Constitutional Assembly: petition-
ers opposed during first phase, 16,663; petitioners supporting inclusion in first phase,
none reported; petitioners opposed during second phase, 546; and petitioners support-
ing inclusion during second phase, 7,032. See generally MARION SPARD, THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL ASSEMBLY: ANNUAL REPORT (1996).
100. All submissions are identified by their unique identifier number assigned by the
Public Participation Programme staff at the time the submission was received.  All of the
submissions were available on a searchable database at www.constitution.org.za/form
.html.  The nature of the database and the fact that many of the submissions address
multiple issues make it impossible to offer exact numbers, but an examination within
those constraints reveals that there are three or four supportive submissions (from indi-
viduals) for every letter of opposition.  Frustratingly, the internet source for these docu-
ments has been offline for a considerable amount of time and remains unavailable
electronically.  Julien Hofman, The Constitutional Assembly Database Project - Resur-
recting a Database Ten Years On, 35 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 79, 79 (2007).
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., N. Webster, Submission #8319, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra note
26; K. McConnell, Submission #6152, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra note 26.
103. See V. Smith, Submission #7289, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra note 26.
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don’t love any different, I don’t want to be treated any different.”104  Many
of the writers identified themselves as lesbians or gay men,105 although far
more contributors expressly identified as heterosexual.106  At least a few
submissions made reference to the broader implications of South Africa’s
equality protections: “The clause in the interim constitution— including
sexual orientation should remain as is . . . serving as an example and a
forerunner for equality to other countries.”107
The submissions from those who opposed retention of sexual orienta-
tion in the constitution were significantly different in form as well as sub-
stance.  For example, most were petitions rather than individually authored
comments.  A typical signed petition from an early stage states:
I hereby strongly object to the legalisation of immoral and unnatural sexual
lifestyles under Chapter 3 Paragraph 8.2 of our interim constitution.  The
phrase “SEXUAL ORIENTATION” must be deleted from our present consti-
tution and must NOT be included in the final constitution that is being
drafted.  Homosexuality, lesbianism, sodomy[,] and bestiality are unnatural,
abnormal[,] and immoral and do not deserve any constitutional protection
under clauses like “sexual orientation.”108
The overwhelming majority of opposition submissions based their
argument on fundamentalist Christian notions of sexual morality.109  In
addition to opposing equality based on sexual orientation, those submis-
sions also often disfavored other progressive aspects of the constitution,
such as abortion rights and the abolition of the death penalty.110
Another common characteristic of the opposing submissions was their
vehemence: “How can any disgusting, deviant sexual behaviour have the
phrase ‘fundamental rights’ protecting it?”111  For progressive South Afri-
cans who hoped that the inclusion of sexual orientation protection in the
Interim Constitution two years earlier provided evidence of a new era of
acceptance, these vituperative submissions must have been disheartening.
104. See C. Minnar, Submission #7149, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra note 26
(capitalization altered).
105. See, e.g., D. Renge, Submission #6036, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra note
26.
106. See, e.g., R. Hitzenroth, Submission #6008, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra
note 26.
107. See Buitendag, Submission #6024, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra note 26.
108. See “Petition,” Submission #5601, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra note 26
(The commentary preceding this submission states: “The [C]onstitutional [A]ssembly
has received 16,363 copies of the following and similar petitions concerning the sexual
orientation clause in the [I]nterim [C]onstitution”).
109. See, e.g., Browne, Submission #5577, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra note 26;
Abraham, Submission #6591, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 9, supra note 26.
110. Many petitions also opposed the proposed legality of abortion and the abolition
of the death penalty.  Others disliked the absence of explicit reference to God. See, e.g.,
MacGregor, et al., Submission #3372, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra note 26; Sub-
mission #5062, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra note 26.
111. See Taylor, Submission #6794, CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 2, supra note 26.
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v. Sexual Orientation is Included in the Final Constitution
The Public Participation Programme culminated a few months prior to
the completion of the Constitutional Assembly’s drafting responsibili-
ties.112  In the last, somewhat feverish few months of the drafting period,
many final decisions were made outside of public scrutiny.113  Several fac-
tors contributed to this.  The Theme Committees had finished much of
their work, the working draft was published and was being distributed, and
a significant number of political compromises needed to be made prior to
consideration of the text by the whole Constitutional Assembly.114  The
negotiations in the party-based Constitutional Committee— where ultimate
authority rested— and other informal negotiations were neither recorded
nor reported.115  Thus, it is difficult to know anything significant about
these discussions other than the results of the process.
On October 10, 1995, the Constitutional Committee agreed to follow
the Technical Committee’s recommendations on several important issues—
including retention of the Interim Constitution’s explicit reference to sex-
ual orientation in the final constitution.116  Due to this decision, Section
Nine of South Africa’s new constitution, “Equality,” would prominently
include protections for gays and lesbians:
9. (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection
and benefit of the law . . . .
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, mari-
tal status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth.
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against any-
one on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3).  National legislation
must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination . . . .117
Just as the Bill of Rights is “a cornerstone of democracy in South
Africa,”118 the Equality provisions form a cornerstone of the Bill of Rights
itself.  Despite significant public opposition, limited legal precedent, rela-
tively inexperienced civil society groups, and a conservative cultural back-
112. Public Participation, PARLIAMENT REP. S. AFRICA, http://www.parliament.gov.za/
live/content.php?Category_ID=21 (“Since the advent of democracy in 1994, it has
become possible for all citizens to get involved in what is happening in Parliament.”).
113. Sarkin, supra note 20, at 71– 75.
114. Id. at 68.
115. HEINZ KLUZ, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA’S
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 100 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
116. Eric C. Christiansen, Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation: Lessons from
Twenty Years of Gay and Lesbian Rights under the South African Constitution 3 (Nov. 10,
2014) [hereinafter Christiansen, Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation] (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
117. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 (emphasis added).  The only other explicit reference is Sec-
tion 35 of the Bill of Rights which secures the right of a “spouse or partner” to visit a
detained or imprisoned person. Id. § 35(2)(i).
118. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-3\CIN302.txt unknown Seq: 21 13-APR-17 15:43
2016 Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation 585
ground, gays and lesbians held on to their groundbreaking protections in
the final South African Constitution.
B. Explaining Gay Equality in the Constitutional Drafting Process
At the end of the apartheid era in the late 1980s, South African gays
and lesbians were poorly organized politically, racially divided, and gener-
ally despised.119  Before the ratification of the post-apartheid constitution,
no domestic legal precedent existed for treating gays and lesbians other
than as criminals.120  Anti-gay sentiment was high.121  And yet, within a
few years, gay South Africans possessed a level of constitutional protection
greater than that of any other nation— a level of legal protection that
remains pre-eminent twenty years later.
How did South Africa— a deeply religious and conservative southern
African nation— become the first country to include constitutional protec-
tions for gays and lesbians?  The answer involves a unique convergence of
elements at the time apartheid was ending in South Africa.122  These ele-
ments include historical, ideological, and procedural influences unique to
South Africa in the 1990s.123
1. The Role of History and Timing
The confluence of three factors set the stage for an evolution in the
legal status of gays and lesbians in a new, multi-racial South Africa.  The
three factors were the simultaneous maturation of the ANC and the bur-
geoning South African gay community; newly formed linkages between
those two previously distinct liberation movements; and new favorable
international legal protections related to sexual orientation.124
In South Africa, gay and lesbian organizing began to achieve some
legitimacy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.125  After years of intention-
ally apolitical organizing, new and politically active gay groups that saw
themselves as a part of the larger anti-apartheid movement were being
established.  Explicit identification with the liberation movements and rec-
119. See EBRAHIM, supra note 14, at 239– 50 (detailing the successes of the Public Par-
ticipation Program in engaging the public); see also CONSTITUTIONAL TALK, vol. 9, supra
note 26 (noting the citizen’s involvement in the Public Participation Program).
120. Christiansen, Ending the Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 25, at 1000.
121. Even as the apartheid government was lifting criminal sanctions against interra-
cial sexual activity in 1988, the Parliament was considering an expansion of laws against
same-sex sexual activity.  Cameron, Unapprehended Felons, supra note 48, at 96.  A 1987
survey of Cape Town residents (conventionally considered the most liberal town in all
Africa) revealed that 71% believed homosexuality to be morally wrong. GORDON ISAACS
& BRIAN MCKENDRICK, MALE HOMOSEXUALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: IDENTITY, INFORMATION,
CULTURE, AND CRISIS 141 (1992).
122. I have struggled to bring historical analysis to the novel and somewhat surpris-
ing results of the constitutional process for gays and lesbians in South Africa in a prior
publication, so the description below is a summary of that analysis.  Christiansen, End-
ing the Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 25.
123. See id. at 1042– 56.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1044.
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ognition of the importance of multi-racial organizing represented an impor-
tant new development.  Furthermore, a host of unrelated occurrences
brought activists and the ANC into direct contact with each other in the
final years of apartheid.  These included, for example, the forced outing of
an anti-apartheid leader and the reporting of some anti-gay remarks by a
prominent ANC figure.  Both developments highlighted the involvement of
gays, lesbians, and their supporters in the broader anti-apartheid move-
ment.126  These and other events ultimately motivated the ANC’s initial
statements affirming the importance of equality based on sexual
orientation.127
Outside of South Africa, international human rights bodies were rec-
ognizing changes in the legal status of gays and lesbians for the first time
in history.  The previously singular— and surprising pro-gay— international
law precedent relating to sexual orientation announced by the European
Court of Human Rights in its Dudgeon decision in 1981128 was affirmed in
Norris in 1991129 and in Modinos in 1994.130  One year later, the United
Nations Human Rights Commission relied on the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights to denounce the criminalization of sex
between men in the Australian province of Tasmania.131  The timing was
fortuitous; these last two pro-gay decisions were announced during the
constitutional drafting period.132
2. Ideology and Non-Racialism
The ANC and other groups within the liberation movement first stated
the goal of a non-discriminatory South Africa in the 1955 Freedom Char-
ter.133  “Non-racialism,” expressed negatively as non-discrimination and
positively as substantive equality, animated ANC discourse throughout its
history.134  This dream of a renewed South Africa, a state founded on the
principles of equality, multi-racial democracy, and human dignity, contin-
ued throughout the years of exile.135  Such philosophical underpinnings of
the constitution were meant to repudiate apartheid’s legal norms.  They
also allowed NCGLE to argue for gay and lesbian equality in a rights-rich
ideological environment.
126. See Fine & Nicol, supra note 47, at 270; see also Mark Gevisser, A Different Fight
for Freedom: A History of South African Lesbian and Gay Organization from the 1950s to
1990s, in DEFIANT DESIRES, supra note 47, 14, 70 (reporting additional comments: “The
gays have no problems . . . I don’t see them suffering.  No one is persecuting them”).
127. See Fine & Nicol, supra note 47, at 270.
128. See generally Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R.
20 (1981) (reserving the question of whether Irish law discriminated against homosex-
ual acts).
129. Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1991).
130. Modinos v. Cyprus, App. No. 15070/89, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485, 494 (1993).
131. See Toonen, supra note 67, para. 9.
132. See Sarkin, supra note 20, at 68.
133. The Freedom Charter of 1955 (S. Afr.).
134. Christiansen, Ending The Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 25, at 1046.
135. Id.
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As a philosophy, non-racialism espoused an end to all forms of dis-
crimination and the inviolability of human rights by the state.  It also acted
as a tool for ending apartheid, creating a democratic government, and heal-
ing the nation.  This same tool was wielded in the pre-drafting era and
throughout the drafting periods to promote inclusion of sexual orientation
as an additional protected category.136  The presumptive inclusion of sex-
ual orientation as a basis for protection, combined with the centrality of
non-racialism in ANC discourse about a post-apartheid nation, strongly
supported the development of anti-discrimination policies that included
express protections for gays and lesbians.
3. Constrained Drafting Process
The third factor contributing to the inclusion of protections for gays
and lesbians was the particular method of drafting the South African Con-
stitution.  The final draft of the constitution was the result of a sequential
process that moved from draft to draft under tight time constraints and
strong political pressure.137  Party-based negotiating committees made the
earliest decisions— and most of the weightiest decisions throughout the
process— behind closed doors.  Additionally, small groups— including
theme committees of experts for the interim text and technical committees
in the final drafting process— directed most of the textual revisions.  Fur-
thermore, the party-based Constitutional Committee approved most final
elements before the last draft was put to a vote— a vote uniformly decided
along party lines.
The consequence of this controlled, sequential process with a limited
number of only indirectly accountable drafters was a final text determined
mostly by experts and party elites.  Gay and lesbian advocates were benefi-
ciaries of this process because their concerns were congruent with the
dominant ideology of the process and several important constitutional
actors were outspoken in their support.
Hence, the stage for this unprecedented protection was set by the
unique history of South Africa and its gay and lesbian citizens.  The call for
gay and lesbian equality emerged contemporaneously with the fundamen-
tal constitutional re-creation of a state that had existed for forty-seven years
with discrimination as its primary political and social reality.  The domi-
nant ideology of liberation movement elites provided the justification for
such an innovative legal protection, allowing sexual orientation protections
to be included as a presumptive corollary of the ANC policy of non-racial-
ism.  Additionally, a highly structured and political party-controlled consti-
tutional drafting process allowed codification of a progressive human
rights standard, including explicit protections for gays and lesbians,
despite uncertain claims of support from the public and international law
precedent.
136. Id. at 1048.
137. Id. at 1052.
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II. Gay and Lesbian Rights at the South African Constitutional Court
Having secured ratification of the first constitution to include express
protections based on sexual orientation, many gay and lesbian activists
had high hopes.  In the years that followed, the South African Constitu-
tional Court repeatedly rose to the challenge presented by the fact of this
unprecedented legal protection for an unpopular segment of South African
society.  In its first two decades, the Court decided six cases related to the
sexual orientation provision of the Equality Clause.138  In each of its judg-
ments, which included constitutional review of the criminalization of
same-sex sexual activity, the application of laws related to family forma-
tion, and the recognition of same-sex relationships, the Court unanimously
affirmed the full legal equality of the gay and lesbian parties before it.
The primary focus of the discussion below is the dramatic cases that
start and conclude the arc of gay rights victories in the last two decades:
the decriminalization of sodomy in 1998 and the requirement of full mar-
riage equality in 2005.
A. Decriminalization in the NCGLE Sodomy Case
In the 1998 decision of NCGLE v. Minister of Justice (“NCGLE Sodomy
case”), the South African Constitutional Court decriminalized consensual
same-sex sexual activity between adult males.139  The unanimous decision
confirmed a lower court ruling140 that declared unconstitutional the com-
mon law offense of sodomy and struck down provisions of the Sexual
Offences Act that criminalized certain vaguely-defined acts between
138. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 2, 5 paras. 2, 6 (S.
Afr.) (citing Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs (Oct. 2002) No. 17280/02 (unpublished));
J and B v. Dir. Gen., Dep’t of Home Affairs & Others 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) (S. Afr.); Du
Toit & Another v. Minister of Welfare and Population Dev. & Others 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC)
(S. Afr.); Satchwell v. President of Rep. of S. Afr. 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr) (granting
remuneration and pension benefits to same-sex partners); Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Les-
bian Equal. & Others v. Minister of Home Affairs & Others 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.)
[hereinafter NCGLE Immigration]; Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of
Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter NCGLE Sodomy].  References
to Fourie in the remainder of this Article refer to the 2005 Constitutional Court case.
139. See, e.g., Du Toit 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) at 16 para. 21 (S. Afr.); Satchwell 2002 (6)
SA 1 (CC) at 17 para. 21 (S. Afr); NCGLE Immigration 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) at 48– 49 para
58 (S. Afr.); NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para. 21 (S. Afr.).
140. Nat’l Coal. for Gay & Lesbian Equal. & Others v. Minister of Justice & Others 1998
(6) BCLR 726 (W) at para. 2 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter NCGLE].  The Witwatersrand High
Court also struck down the common law offenses of sodomy and commission of an
unnatural sexual act to the extent it criminalized acts “committed by a man or between
men which, if committed by a woman or between women or between a man and a
woman, would not constitute an offence.”  These rulings were not referred to the Consti-
tutional Court because a High Court (a South African trial court) is not required to refer
declarations of constitutional invalidity of common law offences to the Court. NCGLE
Sodomy 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para. 2 (S. Afr.) (following the § 172(2)(a) requirement
that declaration of constitutional invalidity of “an Act of parliament, a provincial Act or
any conduct of the President” must be confirmed by the Constitutional Court to have
force, but having no such requirement for common law rules).
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men.141  Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Ackermann held that
the common law and statutory offenses of sodomy violated the equality,
dignity, and privacy rights provided in the South African Constitution.142
On the central issue of equality, Ackermann applied what is now the
standard analysis for all discrimination questions.  Indeed, the NCGLE
Sodomy case marked the first application of the Equality Clause from the
1996 Constitution and it continues to be cited as one of the seminal
descriptions of the multi-stage inquiry South African courts use to evaluate
discrimination claims.143  The core questions are: (1) Does the act discrim-
inate? (2) Is the discrimination unfair? and (3) Can the unfair discrimina-
tion be justified?144
The first inquiry merely asks the parties to identify the differential
treatment under law; in other words, are similarly situated persons or clas-
ses of people treated differently?145  Notably, non-biased types of differen-
tial treatment are common and permissible.146  The second inquiry,
therefore, is whether the discrimination is “unfair.”  Discrimination is pre-
sumed to be unfair if it is based on a classification enumerated in the
Equality Clause: race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or
social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience,
belief, culture, language, and birth.147  Otherwise, determination of unfair-
ness is based on “the position of the complainants in society.”148  Particu-
lar attention is paid to “whether they have suffered in the past from
patterns of disadvantage,” the character and purpose of the provision, and
the impact on the “rights or interests of the complainants . . . .”149  In the
NCGLE Sodomy case, the Court concluded:
(a) Gay men are a permanent minority in society and have suffered in the
past from patterns of disadvantage.  The impact is severe, affecting the dig-
nity, personhood[,] and identity of gay men at a deep level . . . .
(b) [The sodomy prohibition] has no other purpose than to criminalise con-
duct which fails to conform with the moral or religious views of a section of
society.
141. Sexual Offences Act of 1957 § 20A(1) (S. Afr.) (“A male person who commits
with another male person at a party any act which is calculated to stimulate sexual
passion or to give sexual gratification, shall be guilty of an offence.”).  Other statutory
provisions detailing various state employment repercussions were also struck down.
NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para. 106 (S. Afr.).
142. NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) at para. 30 (S. Afr.).
143. Christiansen, Substantive Equality and Sexual Orientation, supra note 116, at 15.
144. See NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) at paras. 16– 17 (S. Afr.) (laying out
these questions and citing to several cases including Harksen v. Lane NO and Others
1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) at para. 53 (S. Afr.)).  While Harksen was decided under the
Interim Constitution, the use by the Court in NCGLE Sodomy adopted the earlier frame-
work for analysis into the equality jurisprudence under the 1996 Constitution.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) at paras. 11, 13 (S. Afr.).
148. Id. at para. 19.
149. Id. (citing Harksen v. Lane NO and Others 1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) paras.
50– 51 (S. Afr.)).
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(c) The discrimination . . . gravely affected the rights and interests of gay
men and deeply impaired their fundamental dignity.150
The challenged sodomy laws, which targeted only same-sex sexual activity
between men, were a presumptively unfair form of discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
In the final stage of the inquiry, justification may exist if the differenti-
ation, although unfair, satisfies the requirements of the Constitution’s Lim-
itations Clause.151  The South African Limitations Clause, like those in the
German and Canadian Constitutions after which it was modeled, identifies
a narrow set of justifications for an otherwise unconstitutional restriction
on a person’s rights.152  In South Africa, the limitation must be “reasona-
ble and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality[,] and freedom . . . .”153
Unfair discrimination that fails to be justified under the Limitations
Clause is a violation of the Constitution and thus must be declared uncon-
stitutional and remedied.  “When deciding a constitutional matter within
its power, a court— (a) must declare that any law or conduct that is incon-
sistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency;
and (b) may make any order that is just and equitable . . . .”154  While the
Court has no flexibility with the declaration of invalidity, it has significant
discretion in relation to the remedy it grants to plaintiffs.
In the NCGLE Sodomy case, the Court held that the laws in question
were not saved by Limitations Clause analysis:155 “[T]here is nothing
which can be placed in the other balance of the scale.  The inevitable con-
clusion is that the discrimination in question is unfair and therefore in
breach of [the Equality Clause].”156  Moreover, the Court conducted a sig-
nificant survey of sodomy laws in Western democracies to demonstrate the
trend of growing judicial disfavor, although it noted the then-precedential
U.S. exception of Bowers v. Hardwick.157
150. Id. at para. 26.
151. Section 36(1) of the 1996 Constitution states:
The rights of the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality[,] and freedom,
taking into account all relevant factors, including— (a) the nature of the right; (b)
the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the
limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less
restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 36(1).
152. Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 54 UCLA L. REV. 789,
798– 800, 840 (2007).
153. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 36(1).
154. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 172(1).
155. Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1)
SA 6 (CC) at para. 27 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter NCGLE Sodomy].
156. Id.
157. Id. at paras. 53– 54. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  The Court’s opinion stressed the
five-to-four nature of Bowers and the “sustained criticism” of its holding.  In disregarding
the American ruling, the Court highlighted the express nature of the sexual orientation
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In Ackerman’s rather technical opinion, sexual orientation discrimina-
tion is just another kind of discrimination rejected in the Constitution.  For
loftier rights language, a reader need look no further than Justice Sachs’s
concurring opinion.  Perhaps predictably, given his long-term concern for
the equality of LGBT persons, Sachs’s opinion affirms the broader impor-
tance of striking down sodomy laws and its symbolic significance for a
new constitutional democracy:
Only in the most technical sense is this a case about who may penetrate
whom where.  At a practical and symbolical level it is about the status, moral
citizenship[,] and sense of self-worth of a significant section of the commu-
nity.  At a more general and conceptual level, it concerns the nature of the
open, democratic[,] and pluralistic society contemplated by the
Constitution.158
Sachs clearly identified the limited but vital capacity of the Constitu-
tional Court when evaluating gay rights issues.  The remainder of his con-
currence focuses on “complementary observations of the broader matters,”
giving him an opportunity to present some considered thoughts on the
constitutional issues of privacy, dignity, and equality as highlighted by the
case.159  This is not an uncommon practice in early Constitutional Court
opinions, especially among justices deeply invested in an expansive and
progressive understanding of the constitutional project, like Sachs.160
B. Getting to the Altar: Family and Relationship Recognition
Over the five years following NCGLE Sodomy, the Court handed down
five additional rulings promoting equality based on sexual orientation.161
Each judgment was a unanimous decision; each was a victory for the gay
plaintiffs; and each reaffirmed the Constitutional Court’s fundamental
commitment to a generous interpretation of South Africa’s Equality Clause
as it applied to lesbians and gay men.162
In the 1999 NCGLE Immigration case, the Court ruled that the equal-
ity protections required that “gays and lesbians who are permanent
residents in the Republic and who are in permanent same-sex life partner-
ships with foreign nationals” receive treatment equal to that given married
heterosexual persons in the immigration law context.163  To reach its pro-
equality conclusion, the Court first discussed the nature of same-sex rela-
tionships— whether they resemble heterosexual relationships in quality and
kind.164  The Court stated several conclusions about the nature of same-
sex relationships: “Gays and lesbians in same-sex life partnerships are as
protections and the fundamentally more protective nature of the South African
Constitution.
158. NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 107 (S. Afr.) (Sachs, J., concurring).
159. Id.
160. Letter from Albie Sachs, supra note 43.
161. See infra notes 163, 167, 172, 176, 187 and accompanying text.
162. Id.
163. Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. & Others v. Minister of Home Affairs &
Others 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) at 48 para. 57 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter NCGLE Immigration].
164. See id. at 44– 46 para. 53.
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capable as heterosexual spouses of expressing and sharing love in its
manifold forms . . . [and] are likewise as capable of forming intimate, per-
manent, committed, monogamous, loyal[,] and enduring relation-
ships . . . .”165
Moreover, the Court affirmed the familial nature of gay relationships
and their fundamental equality with heterosexual families: “they are capa-
ble of constituting a family, whether nuclear or extended, and of establish-
ing, enjoying[,] and benefiting from family life which is not distinguishable
in any significant respect from that of heterosexual spouses.”166  Such lan-
guage, and its underlying legal presumptions, were important to the subse-
quent cases at the Court, most of which touched on the equality of gay
families.  After review of comparative remedies law and an affirmation of
Parliament’s capacity to refine the Court’s action, the Court “cured” the
challenged law by “reading in [to the effective text of the immigration law]
after the word ‘spouse,’ the following words: ‘or partner, in a permanent
same-sex life partnership.’”167
In the 2002 Satchwell case, the Court held that the government must
afford the same-sex partners of South African judges the same employment
benefits provided to opposite-sex spouses.168  In a short, but (again) unani-
mous opinion, the Court ruled that:
Inasmuch as the [Act’s provisions] afford benefits to spouses but not to
same-sex partners who have established a permanent life relationship simi-
lar in other respects to marriage, including accepting the duty to support
one another, such provisions constitute unfair discrimination.169
In just over a dozen substantive paragraphs that rely heavily on the
discussion of family and respect for alternative forms of familial relation-
ship in the NCGLE Immigration case, the Court affirmed the underlying
lesbian relationship and decried the discrimination in the Remuneration
Act.170  The Court had no difficulty saying that the petitioners lived “in
every respect as a married couple and [were] acknowledged as such by
their respective families and friends” and that their relationship was “inti-
mate, committed, exclusive[,] and permanent.”171  Notably, counsel for the
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 59, 61– 62, 67, 69– 70 paras 73, 77, 86, 89.  The Court concluded it had
two options for remedies: to strike down the provision allowing (any) spouses to immi-
grate or to “read in” comparable benefits for same-sex life partners.  The former option
had the significant failing of being “equality with a vengeance,” it created legal equality
by stripping rights away from those legitimately benefiting from an otherwise constitu-
tional provision with strong popular and legislative support.  The latter option had the
difficulty of being a novel verdict not previously applied by the Court.  Here, the Court
elected to “read in” a constitutional remedy that alters the effective text of the statute by
inserting language to fix an unconstitutional fault in the original law.  The order, unlike
the order in NCGLE Sodomy, had no retrospective effect. Id. at para. 89.
168. Satchwell v. President of Rep. of S. Afr. 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) at 18 para. 23 (S. Afr).
169. Id.
170. See id. at 10– 12 paras. 12– 13.
171. Id. at 4 para. 4.
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Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, representing the views
of the government:
[C]onceded without qualification, correctly in [the Court’s] view, that per-
manent same-sex life partners are entitled to found their relationships in a
manner which accords with their sexual orientation and further that such
relationships ought not to be the subject of unfair discrimination.172
In the 2003 DuToit case, the Court ruled that denial of second-parent
adoption rights to gay couples violated their constitutional rights to equal-
ity and dignity, in addition to violating the “best interests of the child”
standard required by the child welfare protections of the Constitution.173
The Act’s limitation “perpetuate[d] the fiction or myth of family homogene-
ity based on the one mother/one father model.  It ignore[d] developments
that have taken place in the country, including the adoption of the
[C]onstitution.”174  The Court concluded that the categorical exclusion of
permanent same-sex couples from the possibility of joint adoption “surely
defeat[ed] the very essence and social purpose of adoption which is to pro-
vide the stability, commitment, affection[,] and support important to a
child’s development . . . .”175  Among the Act’s many faults, its prohibitions
“deprive[d] children of the possibility of a loving and stable family life.”176
Later that year, in the confidentially named case J and B, the Court
applied the same reasoning to a case regarding adoption following artificial
insemination.177  In a very brief judgment, another unanimous Court
ruled on behalf of the lesbian appellants.  Consistent with the previous
cases, the Court held that Section 5 of the Status Act unfairly distinguished
married persons from permanent same-sex life partners.178  Section 5 dis-
criminated by denying to same-sex partners a right granted to heterosexual
married couples: for both partners to become the legal parents of children
born from artificial insemination.179  The Court remedied the unconstitu-
tional fault in the law by “reading in” the words “or permanent same-sex
life partner” whenever wife or husband was mentioned.180
These three rulings from 2002 and 2003 also evidenced the Court’s
increasing frustration with parliamentary inaction.181  Strong evidence
had existed that the Court would rule against sexual orientation-based dis-
172. Writing for the Court, Justice Madala described this concession as “correct[ ] in
my view.” Id. at 13 para. 15.
173. Du Toit & Another v. Minister of Welfare and Population Dev. & Others 2003 (2)
SA 198 (CC) at 29– 30 paras. 41– 43 (S. Afr.).
174. Id. at 21 para. 28.
175. Id. at 16 para. 21.
176. Id. at 16– 17 para. 22.
177. J and B v. Dir. Gen., Dep’t of Home Affairs & Others 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) at
para. 13 (S. Afr.).
178. Id.
179. Id. at para. 15.
180. Id. at para. 28.
181. The fact that the government ministers did not actively oppose the gay and les-
bian applicants in Satchwell, Du Toit, and J and B further suggests that the government
did not believe there was a viable constitutional argument in opposition to the gay rights
claim. See generally J and B 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) (S. Afr.); Du Toit & Another v. Minister
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crimination in family law generally and civil marriage laws specifically at
least since the ruling in the NCLGE Immigration case.  Indeed, it was diffi-
cult to imagine any other result once the text of the final constitution was
certified in 1996.  Nevertheless, Parliament had refused to address the
extant discrimination in statutes (and the common law) or to take defini-
tive action on the issue of marriage equality, refusing to act absent une-
quivocal pressure from the Court.182
Parliament failed to pass legislation that would bring South African
family law into compliance with the equality mandate of the Constitution
and the ANC neglected to apply sufficient pressure to advance such a rem-
edy.183  The Court expressly declared its growing frustration in J and B:
“Comprehensive legislation regularizing relationships between gay and les-
bian persons is necessary.  It is unsatisfactory for the Courts to grant piece-
meal relief to members of the gay and lesbian community as and when
aspects of their relationships are found to be prejudiced by unconstitu-
tional legislation . . . .”184  The Court chided Parliament for its inaction,
reminding its members that they were formally bound by the Constitu-
tion185 and that they had a constitutional duty to “respect, protect, pro-
mote[,] and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.”186  The Executive and
Legislature were therefore “obliged to deal comprehensively and timeously
with existing unfair discrimination against gays and lesbians.”187  Parlia-
ment did not— at least not until there was unequivocal judicial pressure.
C. Marriage Equality at the Constitutional Court
Marié Fourie and her girlfriend Cecelia Bonthuys had been together
for nearly ten years when they brought suit for legal recognition of their
relationship in the Pretoria High Court in 2002.188  The Court’s legal con-
clusion, that the rights and privileges of marriage may not be denied on
the basis of sexual orientation, was mostly unsurprising.189  Nearly every
element of the Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs decision was dictated by
of Welfare and Population Dev. & Others 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) (S. Afr.); Satchwell v.
President of Rep. of S. Afr. 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
182. See generally J and B 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) (S. Afr.); Du Toit 2003 (2) SA 198
(CC) (S. Afr.); Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
183. See generally J and B 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) (S. Afr.); Du Toit 2003 (2) SA 198
(CC) (S. Afr.); Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
184. J and B 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) at para. 23 (S. Afr.).
185. Id. at para. 25.
186. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 8(1) (“The Bill of Rights . . . binds the legislature, the
executive, the judiciary[,] and all organs of state.”).
187. J and B 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) at para. 25 (S. Afr.).
188. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at paras. 2, 6 (S. Afr.).
189. Du Toit & Another v. Minister of Welfare and Population Dev. & Others 2003 (2)
SA 198 (CC) (S. Afr.); Satchwell v. President of Rep. of S. Afr. 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.);
Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. & Others v. Minister of Home Affairs & Others
1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter NCGLE Immigration]; Nat’l Coal. for Gay and
Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter
NCGLE Sodomy].
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precedent.190  The Court’s unanimous substantive ruling was a relatively
straightforward, incremental extension of existing precedent related to gay
and lesbian equality in the realms of family formation and relationship
recognition.
The Court held that:
[T]aking account of the decisions of this court, and bearing in mind the
symbolic and practical impact that exclusion from marriage has on same-sex
couples, there can only be one answer to the question as to whether or not
such couples are denied equal protection and subjected to unfair discrimina-
tion.  Clearly, they are, and in no small degree.191
The exclusion of same-sex couples from access to civil marriage was unfair
discrimination because it was differential legal treatment on a prohibited
basis, sexual orientation.192  The same-sex couple plaintiffs wanted South
African law to “accept the reality of their presence, and the integrity in its
own terms, of their intimate life . . . .”193  This had not occurred.  Instead,
“the law in the past failed to secure for same-sex couples the dignity, status,
benefits[,] and responsibilities that it accords to heterosexual couples.”194
The Court asserted that the gay and lesbian parties sought “the right to be
acknowledged as equal and to be embraced with dignity by the
law . . . .”195
Although the substantive holding was not significantly in doubt, the
Court’s remedy was surprising: a one-year delay in enforcing the order of
invalidity.196  The Court could have directly and immediately fixed the
problem Parliament refused to address: the absence of a comprehensive
legal scheme addressing same-sex family relationships.  In prior cases, the
Court had used its expansive remedial powers to invalidate discriminatory
laws or to “read in” necessary language to cure a constitutional defect.197
The Court took neither route in Fourie.  Rather, it identified the constitu-
tional fault but suspended its ruling of invalidity.198  The Court sent the
deficient law back to Parliament and gave it twelve months to “cure the
190. See J and B 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) (S. Afr.); Du Toit 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) (S.
Afr.); Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.); NCGLE Immigration 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) (S.
Afr.); NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.).
191. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 49– 50 para. 78 (S. Afr.).
192. Id. (“The common law and section 30(1) of the Marriage Act continue to deny to
same-sex couples equal protection and benefit of the law . . . and taken together result in




196. Id. at 84– 86 paras. 135– 37.
197. See, e.g., Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. & Others v. Minister of Home
Affairs & Others 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) at 73– 74 para. 98 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter NCGLE
Immigration] (“[S]ection 25(5) of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991, is to be read as
though the following words appear . . . .”); Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v.
Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 2 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter NCGLE
Sodomy] (invalidating: “It is declared that section 20A of the Sexual Offenses Act, 1957 is
inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid”).
198. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 100– 01 para. 161 (S. Afr.).
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defect” in the Marriage Act.199
Parliament was ordered to address the discrimination in South African
family law.  Same-sex couples may not be “subjected to marginalization or
exclusion by law either directly or indirectly.”200  At last, Parliament had to
perform the task the Court had reminded them was theirs.  As Justice
Sachs said in Fourie, “It’s not only the Court’s duty to protect constitutional
rights.  In fact, [the duty is] mainly legislative.”201  Parliament considered
how precisely to end the “present exclusion of same-sex couples from
enjoying the status and entitlements” of marriage.”202  The legislature’s
task was carefully circumscribed by both the general ruling in Fourie and
the judgment’s declaration of two mandatory “guiding principles” relevant
to Parliament’s assigned task.203
The first principle prohibited Parliament from achieving equality in
marriage law by ending the state’s role in marriage altogether.  As the
Court said it, “[l]evelling down so as to deny access to civil marriage to all
would not promote the achievement of the enjoyment of equality . . . .”204
The second principle prohibited a separate but equal formulation for mar-
riage.  The parliamentary response could not create or employ produce
“new forms of marginalization.”205  Formal legal equality was not called
for, substantive legal equality was required.  Parliament must consider the
real life implications of its decisions.  The Court would not be blind to the
context in which that happens; equality and dignity require concern for
“the intangibles as well as the tangibles involved.”206  “Ignoring the con-
text, once convenient, is no longer permissible . . . .”207  This second prin-
ciple seemed intended to reject the proposed legislative solution of civil
unions, as a lower tier of relationship recognition for gay couples.  The
prior identification of those two guiding principles saved the Court from
further review of the marriage legislation passed by Parliament in 2006.208
199. In justifying its delay, the Court highlighted that much legislative work had
already been done preparing Parliament to make a decision in this area.  The Court
noted that the South African Law Reform Commission was finalizing a legislative report
and proposals.  The Commission process had involved extensive public input, would be
imminently available to the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (and
through her to Parliament), and would be a comprehensive review of the necessary legal
changes for formal recognition of same-sex family law arrangements. Id. at 81– 82
paras. 130– 31.  The SALRC in fact noted that the Court ruling would aid it in its recom-
mendations to Parliament. Id. at 81 para. 129 n.124.
200. Id. at 81, 91 paras. 129 n.124, 147.
201. Joe Katz, South African Judge Addresses Gay Marriage at Swift Hall, CHI. MAROON
(Jan. 13, 2006), http://chicagomaroon.com/2006/01/13/south-african-judge-addresses-
gay-marriage-at-swift-hall/ (emphasis added).
202. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 91 para. 147 (S. Afr.).
203. Id. at 91– 94, paras. 148– 50.
204. Id. at 92 para. 149.
205. Id. at 93– 94 para. 150.
206. Id. at 96 para. 153.
207. Id. at 94– 95 para. 151.
208. See Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.).
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III. A South African Gay Rights Jurisprudence
A. Summarizing Twenty Years of Constitutional Adjudication
The South African Constitutional Court’s extant gay rights jurispru-
dence is the most affirmative constitutional gay rights jurisprudence of any
national court in the world.  In the twenty years since the Constitution
came into force, the Court has repeatedly and forcefully held that the trans-
formative constitutional values of equality and dignity forbid the state from
denigrating or excluding gays and lesbians from full and equal citizenship
based merely on their position as a traditionally disfavored minority.  The
Court’s jurisprudence has been typified by three traits: robust engagement
and impactful application of the prohibition of discrimination based on
sexual orientation; sincere consideration and fair-minded assessment of
the historical and social context of anti-gay discrimination; and unwaver-
ing commitment to advancing the transformative values of equality and
dignity in the Constitution.
1. Impactful Engagement
Robust and impactful judicial engagement is the first characteristic
that typifies the Constitutional Court in the area of gay and lesbian equal-
ity.  In its first twenty years, the Court issued substantive holdings in a
surprising number of high-profile gay rights cases.209  Indeed, all of the
gay rights cases were heard in the first decade following the inauguration
of the 1996 Constitution.210  The justices have not shied away from the
controversy associated with their socially unpopular views affirming gay
and lesbian equality.  In its first case, the Court unflinchingly addressed
the right to same-sex sexual activity, affirming the deeper dimensions and
fundamental dignity concerns associated with the physical manifestations
of human sexuality.211  In its most recent case, the Court embraced the
most sharply contested modern gay rights claim: full equality in civil mar-
riage.212  The justices have not been reticent to strike down discriminatory
government policies and laws: “Although the Constitution itself cannot
destroy homophobic prejudice it can require the elimination of the public
institutions which are based on and perpetuate such prejudice.”213
209. See, e.g., Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.); J and B v. Dir. Gen., Dep’t of
Home Affairs & Others 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) (S. Afr.); Du Toit & Another v. Minister of
Welfare and Population Dev. & Others 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) (S. Afr.); Satchwell v. Presi-
dent of Rep. of S. Afr. 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.); Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal.
& Others v. Minister of Home Affairs & Others 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter
NCGLE Immigration]; Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice and
Others 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter NCGLE Sodomy].
210. See, e.g., Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.); J and B 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) (S.
Afr.); Du Toit 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) (S. Afr.); Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.);
NCGLE Immigration 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.); NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S.
Afr.).
211. See generally NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.).
212. See generally Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.).
213. NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 130 (S. Afr.).
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Moreover, the Court’s judgments have been uniformly unanimous in
result and have demonstrated little prevarication in their description of gay
and lesbian individuals’ rights or the value of same-sex relationships.214
Furthermore, support for gay and lesbian equality under the Constitution
has not been the vanity project of a few justices; rather, a variety of justices
have authored the lead opinions with significant, meaningful concurrences
reinforcing the core holdings.215  There have been a total of five different
lead authors (and two concurrences) for the Court’s six sexual orientation
cases.  The justices have seemingly embraced their responsibility to
advance equality and prohibit “marginalization or exclusion by law, either
directly or indirectly.”216
Notably, the term “impactful engagement” is not intended as a euphe-
mism for judicial activism.217  The Court’s role is properly described as
engagement rather than activism because the Court has stayed within the
scope of the specific, live controversies brought properly before the Court.
For example, although few scholars doubted the eventual result, the Court
determined the unconstitutionality of the civil marriage limits related to
sexual orientation only when the case was properly before the Court.218
The Court did not hesitate to assert the underlying equality of same-sex
couples and their relationships in earlier cases, but it called upon Parlia-
ment to act rather than inserting itself into an insufficiently ripe dispute,
as its holding in Fourie demonstrates.  Moreover, there is a special role for
judicial engagement in the enforcement and interpretation of a transforma-
tive-by-design constitution; judicial inaction (and perhaps even judicial
moderation) might represent inappropriate ideological support for the sta-
tus quo.
214. See Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.); J and B 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) (S. Afr.);
Du Toit 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) (S. Afr.); Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.); NCGLE
Immigration 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.); NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.).
215. See Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.); J and B 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) (S. Afr.);
Du Toit 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) (S. Afr.); Satchwell 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.); NCGLE
Immigration 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.); NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (S. Afr.).
216. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 91 para. 147 (S. Afr.).
217. Like many American constitutional law scholars, I doubt the ultimate efficacy of
the term “judicial activism,” which is intended to refer to improper ideologically-based,
result-oriented adjudication but in contemporary (American) discourse most often
means only that the speaker disagrees with judge’s or justice’s reasoning or result.
218. Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs 2003 (5) SA 301 (CC) at 7, 9– 10 (S. Afr.)
(denying a direct appeal to the Constitutional Court and requiring the parties to appeal
to the Supreme Court of Appeal).  The Supreme Court of Appeal, a lower South African
court for purposes of constitutional claims, struck the statutory and common law mar-
riage law even though the [common law definition] was not properly challenged by the
parties before it. Fourie v. Minister of Home Affairs 2005 (3) SA 429 (SCA) (S. Afr.).  In
fact, the Fourie case was joined with a separate case when it was considered by the
Constitutional Court in 2005. Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home
Affairs 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.) (including a statutory challenge to the Marriage
Act, Act 25 of 1961).
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2. Contextual Assessment
The Constitutional Court’s commitment to understanding discrimina-
tion and protecting rights requires the Court to consider the existing dis-
criminatory environment, as well as the framework of substantive equality
built into the post-apartheid constitutions.  For example, context was vital
for the Court in its assessment of the impact of sodomy laws (even unen-
forced sodomy laws) on gay men.219  The Court identified the deeper
dimensions of the law: “At a practical and symbolical level [these criminal
laws were] about the status, moral citizenship[,] and sense of self-worth of
a significant section of the community.”220
Context showed that sodomy laws had been used as a tool of oppres-
sion and as an expression of social disapproval— unacceptable under the
new constitution.221  The Court declared it would not be blind to the envi-
ronment in which discrimination happens; equality and dignity require a
concern for the “intangible as well as the tangibles involved.”222
The Court discussed existing animus toward gays and lesbians as an
element of the background reality to be reflected in its decisions, not as a
legally irrelevant fact to be ignored.  The Court acknowledged the hurt of
discrimination, as when it acknowledged that denial of recognition of
same-sex relationships “has been wounding and the scars are evident in
our society to this day.”223  Indeed, the Court expressly acknowledged the
negativity with which gays and lesbians were commonly viewed in South
Africa, but strongly affirmed that “[t]he ubiquity of a prejudice cannot sup-
port its legitimacy.”224
The importance of context was particularly evident in the discussion
of religious arguments against marriage equality.  Justice Sachs acknowl-
edged the role of procreation in religious understandings of marriage, but
denied its significance to a legal understanding of the institution.225  For
the Court, the constitutional duty was both to take seriously the religious
views of the majority of South Africans as well as to protect the rights of
non-believers and minority faiths.226  “Certainly the Court cannot assess
the correctness of particular biblical interpretations of sources of law but it
can assess that marriage equality has no direct impact on marriages of
traditional believers.”227  As a consequence, the judgment stated unequivo-
cally that “[i]t would be out of order to employ the religious sentiments of
some as a guide to the constitutional rights of others.”228  Directly address-
ing these dominant religious opinions enriched the Court’s rulings by
219. See NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 107 (S. Afr.).
220. Id.
221. Id. at para. 30.
222. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 96 para. 153 (S. Afr.).
223. Id. at 49– 50 para. 78.
224. Id. at 71– 72 para. 113.
225. Id. at 54– 55 paras. 85– 87.
226. Id. at 55– 56 para. 89.
227. Id. at 58 para. 92.
228. Id.
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acknowledging the social context.  It more incisively distinguished the legal
conclusion from the extant social reality.
Moreover, the Court’s assignment of the task of realizing full marriage
equality to Parliament while effectively prescribing the result229 demon-
strated a sensitivity to social context— and political savvy— that demonstra-
bly benefitted an unpopular sexual minority.  The Court even set a
timeline for the legislative action.  The expected (and actual) result was that
Parliament passed marriage equality legislation in compliance with the
Fourie ruling.230  The ANC, the standard-bearers of the most notable liber-
ation movement of the last century, as well as the overwhelmingly domi-
nant domestic political party, became the immediate focus for marriage
equality in South African law.231
The democratic legitimacy of a legislative resolution,232 the require-
ment of affirmative legislative support for gay and lesbian South Africans
from the ANC, and the inevitable discussion of the meaning of gay rights in
the context of South Africa’s constitutional values, advanced the realization
of equality both domestically and internationally.  Moreover, the result
diminishes the impression of marriage equality as first world, Western,
and Northern hemisphere affectation.  The example of enforceable prohibi-
tions on discrimination based on sexual orientation and even marriage
equality expanded the potential for LGBT equality globally.
3. Transformative Values
The third evident characteristic of the Constitutional Court’s gay
rights jurisprudence is its commitment to the transformative nature of the
post-apartheid constitutions.  The Constitution’s commitment to expansive
notions of equality is reflected in the Court’s rulings and in its approach.
In assessing rights under a transformative constitution, “[t]he crucial deter-
minant will always be whether human dignity is enhanced or diminished
and the achievement of equality is promoted or undermined by the mea-
sure concerned.”233  The Court’s commitment to expansive, substantive
equality rather than merely formal, legal equality has typified its approach
to the cases discussed above.  This is reflected in the Court’s broad itera-
tion of the plaintiffs’ claims:
[T]he [gay and lesbian parties] in this matter seek . . . not the right to be left
alone, but the right to be acknowledged as equals and to be embraced with
dignity by the law . . . .  [T]he law in the past failed to secure for same-sex
couples the dignity, status, benefits[,] and responsibilities that it accords to
229. Id. at 100– 01 para. 161 (providing the read-in remedy if Parliament does not act
within twelve months).
230. See generally Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.).
231. Barry Bearak, Final Results Show Resounding Victory for A.N.C. in South Africa,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/26/world/africa/26SAF
RICA.html (describing the ANC’s election victory with 66% of the April 2009 vote).
232. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 108– 09 para. 171 (S. Afr.) (O’Regan, J.,
concurring).
233. Id. at 95– 96 para. 152.
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heterosexual couples.234
Moreover, the cases were not just about the plaintiffs and their dis-
crimination claims, they were about the values of the nation.  Of course,
the Court’s jurisprudence removed criminal proscription, granted access to
state-sponsored benefits, and ensured government recognition of relation-
ships, but “[a]t a more general and conceptual level, it concern[ed] the
nature of the open, democratic[,] and pluralistic society contemplated by
the Constitution.”235  Each case served not only the particular gay or les-
bian plaintiffs, but the new-born constitutional democracy “in which gov-
ernment is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally
protected by law.”236  The Court understood its institutional role of provid-
ing support for the rights-focused transformation started with the Interim
Constitution.  And, it clearly believed its gay rights decisions have success-
fully done so: “From today a section of the community can feel the equal
concern and regard of the Constitution and enjoy lives less threatened, less
lonely and more dignified.  The law catches up with an evolving social
reality.”237
Alas, legal decisions are limited in their impact.  The Court’s success
in invoking constitutional principles to invalidate biased legal rules almost
exclusively impacts laws and actions of government institutions.  As we
shall see below, achieving positive effects on the day-to-day experience of
bias and discrimination faced by gays and lesbians has proven to be much
more difficult.
B. The Inadequacy of Constitutional Law Protections
Sadly, the legal protections are only one side of the story of sexual
orientation discrimination in South Africa.  Indeed, for many gay South
Africans, the Constitution plays only a small part of the overall story— a
part that does not include their lived reality.  The broad legal protections
must be contrasted with widespread social disapproval of homosexuality,
recurrent and routine discrimination, and the dramatic prevalence of hate
crimes, especially crimes of homophobic violence.238
234. Id. at 49– 50 para. 78.
235. Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1)
SA 6 (CC) at para. 107 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter NCGLE Sodomy] (Sachs, J., concurring).
236. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, pmbl.
237. NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 130 (S. Afr.).
238. Much has been written by scholars and activists that examine these complex
issues in greater depth and sophistication than is appropriate for this Article.  Accord-
ingly, the discussion in this Article is meant primarily for instrumentalist purposes. See
Helen Wells & Louise Polders, Anti-Gay Hate Crimes in South Africa: Prevalence, Report-
ing Practices, and Experiences of the Police, 67 AGENDA: EMPOWERING WOMEN FOR GENDER
EQUITY 20, 20 (2006). See generally Combating Violence Against LGBTI People in South
Africa, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2013/08/02/
combating-violence-against-lgbti-people-in-south-africa; Robyn Dixon, In South Africa’s
Black Townships, Being Gay Can Be Fatal, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2011), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/2011/may/27/world/la-fg-south-africa-gay-killings-20110528; Glynnis
Underhill, People Are Dying as We Speak, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE (May 6, 2011), http:/
/mg.co.za/article/2011-05-06-people-are-dying-as-we-speak.
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1. Danger and Disfavor
In a 2008 study of attitudes toward same-sex sexual activity, 83.6% of
South Africans said it was always wrong.239  Indeed, only 7.7% of South
Africans reported believing that same-sex sexual activity was not wrong at
all.240  These results are even more striking because they track attitudes
toward activity unanimously declared constitutional by the Constitutional
Court more than a decade earlier.  Studies regularly show these kinds of
disparities between popular attitudes and legal protections in South
Africa.241  Moreover, attitudes in South Africa seem to be improving
slowly.  A more recent 2013 study found that 61% of South Africans felt
that society should not accept homosexuality.242  And while South Africa
had dramatically higher favorable responses (32%) than any other nation
in Africa (the next highest was Kenya at 8%), South Africa’s rate of disfavor
was significantly higher than any other nation with comparable legal
protections.243
The disfavor with which gay and lesbian people (as well as bisexual
and transgender people) are viewed results in frequent acts of overt dis-
crimination and physical harm.  As Justice Minister Radebe recently said,
“Notwithstanding the comprehensive constitutional and legal framework
and protection for LGBTI persons, we have sadly witnessed acts of discrim-
ination and violent attacks being perpetrated against LGBTI persons.”244
Homophobic violence in South Africa has taken many forms but it has
its most gruesome expression in the epidemic of so-called “corrective
rape.”  Corrective rape is the practice of sexual assault primarily against
lesbians or other gender non-conforming women and transgender persons,
for the claimed purpose (or pretense) of “curing” them of their homosexu-
ality.245  These crimes most frequently, though not exclusively, are perpe-
trated in townships against black lesbians.246  As a recent report baldly
asserted, “rape is fast becoming the most widespread hate crime against
lesbian women in townships across South Africa.”247  While this category
of hate crime is connected to the appalling prevalence of rape in South
239. Tom W. Smith, Cross-National Differences in Attitudes Towards Homosexuality, 31
GSS CROSS-NATIONAL REP. 1, 17 (2011).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. The Global Divide on Homosexuality: Greater Acceptance in More Secular and
Affluent Countries, PEW RES. CTR. (June 4, 2013), www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-
global-divide-on-homosexuality.
243. Id.
244. SAPA, Radebe Launches LGBTI Violence Programme, IOL NEWS (Apr. 29, 2014),
www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/radebe-launches-lgbti-violence-programme-1.168156
3#.VF_n6Mn4LC6.
245. We’ll Show You You’re a Woman: Violence and Discrimination Against Black Lesbi-
ans and Transgender Men in South Africa, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 5, 2011), https://www
.hrw.org/report/2011/12/05/well-show-you-youre-woman/violence-and-discrimination-
against-black-lesbians-and.
246. See generally id.
247. Hate Crimes: The Rise of ‘Corrective’ Rape in South Africa, ACTION AID (2009),
www.rapeoutcry.co.za/home/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/ActionAid-Corrective-Rape
.pdf.
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Africa, the roots of this specific form of violence lie in both sexism and
hatred of LGBT persons.248  Moreover, while the rape statistics are unlikely
to reflect the full scope of the problem (as with both sexual assault and
anti-gay hate crimes generally), there are estimates of up to ten reported
corrective rapes a week.249
There are critical concerns about corrective rape that extend beyond
the acts of violence to doubts about the state’s response: Do police suffi-
ciently investigate the crimes?  Do state prosecutors diligently pursue the
perpetrators?  Do local authorities show adequate concern?  Does public
opinion sufficiently condemn these acts?  Fundamentally, are the state and
the public complicit in this on-going epidemic of violence?  At the intersec-
tion of “homophobia, sexism[,] and gender-motivated violence” there will
be no easy solutions, but the on-going nature of the crisis demands a force-
ful and impactful response.250
The government has acknowledged the many problems with discrimi-
nation, but has, thus far, been unable to solve them.  The state has initiated
a variety of legislative responses, including specialized legislation to
address discrimination.  Relevant laws include the Employment Equity
Act,251 the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination
Act (the Equality Act),252 and other laws that touch on equality issues.253
248. See Lydia Smith, Corrective Rape: The Homophobic Fallout of Post-Apartheid South
Africa, TELEGRAPH (May 21, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/
11608361/Corrective-rape-The-homophobic-fallout-of-post-apartheid-South-Africa.html
(“In a country strongly influenced by traditional cultures and religious groups, correc-
tive rape is a reaction to protect the status quo . . . .”).
249. SCOTT LONG, A. WIDNEY BROWN & GAIL COOPER, HUM. RTS. WATCH, MORE THAN A
NAME: STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 193
(2003) (“In the absence of adequate statistical investigation, the evidence is anecdotal;
the fear, though, is palpable”); see Lee Middleton, ‘Corrective Rape’: Fighting a South Afri-
can Scourge, TIME (Mar. 8, 2011), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599
,2057744,00.html (“South Africa should be a beacon of tolerance.  Its constitution was
the first in the world to outlaw discrimination based on sexual orientation . . . .  But in
the townships on the city’s outskirts, another reality reigns.  The rate of violence against
women in South Africa is among the highest in the world.”).
250. Roderick Brown, Corrective Rape in South Africa: A Continuing Plight Despite an
International Human Rights Response, 18 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 45, 47 (2012)
(addressing what steps have already been taken and “what steps need to be taken to
more effectively address the problem not only in South Africa, but also across the
globe”); see Sekoetlane Jacob Phamodi, Hate Crimes: “Homophobic Rape,” RAPE OUTCRY,
www.rapeoutcry.co.za[domain DNE]/home/?page_id=177 (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
See generally Lorenzo Di Silvio, Correcting Corrective Rape: Carmichele and Developing
South Africa’s Affirmative Obligations To Prevent Violence Against Women, 99 GEO. L.J.
1470, 1474– 75 (2011) (suggesting what South Africa’s affirmative obligations to pre-
vent corrective rape might look like).
251. See generally Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (S. Afr.) (“[To] eliminate unfair
discrimination in employment [and] redress the effects of [past employment]
discrimination.”).
252. See generally Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
4 of 2000 (S. Afr.) (prohibiting unfair discrimination by government, private organiza-
tions, and individuals through legislation, measures, and remedies); DEP’T OF JUSTICE
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEV., STAND AND DEFEND YOUR RIGHT TO EQUALITY (2011) (explain-
ing terms and provisions of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrim-
ination Act).
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These laws attempt to translate the constitutional discrimination prohibi-
tions into statutory law.  Parliament has also established specialized Equal-
ity Courts to address discrimination by private parties.  But the
discrimination and the violence continue:
In spite of this enabling legal environment, the lived reality for many LGBTI
persons is quite a different story.  On the most extreme end of a wide spec-
trum of discriminatory experiences, there are frequent reports of extreme
violence inflicted on young, black, lesbian women in the form of so-called
“corrective” rape, often ending in murder.  Gay men and transgender per-
sons are also often targets of physical violence, and labour discrimination
and exposure to derogatory and threatening speech is also common.
Finally, deprioritisation, marginalisation, exclusion[,] and targeted victimis-
ation by those public institutions intended to provide services and protec-
tion are everyday realities for LGBTI persons in many communities, leading
to a lack of resources when crimes are committed and resulting in victims’
fear to even report crimes.254
Consequentially, many gays and lesbians continue to have a particular and
realistic fear of discriminatory treatment and homophobic violence, regard-
less of the constitutional and statutory protections.
2. Social Change and the Courts
It is no great revelation that even the much-praised South African
courts have proven insufficient to eradicate discrimination based on sexual
orientation.  Courts cannot achieve a socially just society on their own,
neither generally nor in the limited context of gay and lesbian equality.
Progressive constitutional rights, a sympathetic court, and willing plaintiffs
are not enough.  This is true despite the fact that the gay rights litigation
strategy of the last two decades has been, from an objective and relative
perspective, exceedingly successful at securing pro-gay rulings and transi-
tioning lofty constitutional promises into concrete legal rules.
Expectations of judicial impacts on social transformation should be
modest in scope and appropriately tailored.  Regrettably, it is reasonable to
expect only limited outcomes from courts, not full-scale change.255  This is
particularly true in nations like South Africa, where both the Court’s and
the Constitution’s views are so divergent from popular opinion.  Substan-
tive change in social attitudes must come from extra-judicial efforts— par-
ticularly from civil society and cause-based organizing.256  Ideally, this is
accompanied by appropriate support from governmental entities.
253. See, e.g., Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Bill of 2003, Bill 37B (S.
Afr.) (allowing legal change of sex identification under limited circumstances).
254. See generally DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEV., NATIONAL INTERVENTION
STRATEGY FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX (LGBTI) SECTOR
(2014), www.justice.gov.za/vg/lgbti/2014-LGBTI-Strategy.pdf.
255. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 3 (1991) (arguing that judicial capacity for social change is limited). See gener-
ally LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE (David A. Sch-
ultz ed., 1998) (discussing a variety of critical responses to the Hollow Hope thesis).
256. See ROSENBERG, supra note 255, at 7– 8.
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The South African Constitutional Court’s contributions were assur-
edly groundbreaking and legally transformative, but the Court has been an
insufficient instrument for the realization of full, substantive equality for
gays and lesbians in South Africa.  Nevertheless, the final part of this Arti-
cle identifies several significant and affirmative comparative lessons drawn
from how the Court has crafted, interpreted, and enforced its progressive,
gay-rights inclusive, and rights-oriented Constitution.
IV. Lessons from the South African Experience
Careful examination of the drafting history, Constitutional Court
adjudication, and the practical insufficiencies of the South African Consti-
tution’s inclusion of sexual orientation protections highlights three catego-
ries of lessons drawn from the last two decades of constitutional rights in
South Africa.  These lessons include an encouraging insight about novel
and progressive elements in the drafting of modern constitutions, some
modest claims about the capacity of courts to combat inequality based on
sexual orientation, and a hopeful affirmation of the value of even unreal-
ized constitutional aspirations for the fields of comparative constitutional-
ism and gay and lesbian equality.
A. Lessons for Progressive Constitutional Drafting
Rather than being a cautionary tale about progressive constitution-
drafting hubris, two decades of constitutional adjudication in South Africa
demonstrate the real, if modest, rewards of bold constitutionalism.  Follow-
ing apartheid, the capacious vision of substantive equality in enumerated
civil, political, and socio-economic rights was joined with a broadly
empowered and respected institution, the Constitutional Court.  The pair-
ing of effusive rights protections with a capstone court composed of jus-
tices aligned with the values of the new transformative Constitution created
an opportunity for considerable rights adjudication in just twenty years.
This achievement started with the enumeration of these rights in the
Constitution
If end-of-the-century human rights scholars had written a “best prac-
tices” manual for constitution drafters, the collection of rights and the
mechanisms for enforcement of those rights would look very much like the
South African Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution.  Of course, that is no
coincidence.  The process of drafting the South African Constitution was “a
deliberate attempt to have a fundamental instrument of government that
embraced basic human rights.”257  As its Preamble states, one of the Con-
stitution’s core purposes was to “establish a society based on democratic
values, social justice[,] and fundamental human rights.”258
257. Jonathan Faull, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Knows Her Constitutions, AFRICA IS A COUN-
TRY (Feb. 16, 2012), www.africasacountry.com/ruthbaderginsburg/ (quoting U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg).
258. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, pmbl.
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One of the abiding lessons from the South African experiment in pro-
gressive constitutionalism is that constitutional drafting need not fit within
traditional or proven patterns.  Novelty in constitution making is not a per
se flaw.  The South African Constitution included relatively exceptional
rights (for example, enforceable social welfare and sustainable environ-
mental rights) with broad applicability (including prohibitions on private
discrimination and expanded non-discrimination categories like sexual
orientation) and permitted generous enforcement through its permissive
standing and remedial provisions.259  For many commenters, this was
promising too much.260  It seemed a recipe for popular disappointment,
court delegitimation, or state failure.  But the last twenty years of progres-
sive constitutional adjudication in South Africa belie that expectation.
Of course, rights in a constitutional document are not enough; an
empowered judiciary aligned with those constitutional values is, similarly,
a necessary but insufficient element.  “Bold Constitutions require bold
judges.”261  The first generation of South African justices had significant
prior exposure to human rights issues, having seen their denial first hand
by the time of their 1994 appointment by President Mandela.262  Having
participated in the struggle against apartheid, they saw transformative
rights adjudication as a core purpose of the Constitutional Court.  As for-
mer Chief Justice Chaskalson described it, “Under our Constitution the
normative value system and the goal of transformation, are
intertwined.”263
The expansive progressive elements of the Constitution have worked,
in large part, because the drafters and the justices shared an affirmative
constitutional purpose: facilitating South Africa’s transformation from the
apartheid state to a multi-racial democracy.  The Constitution “demands
[of judges] . . . a legal order be established that gives substance to its found-
ing values— democracy, dignity, equality[,] and freedom . . . .”264  This
approach envisions South Africa as a reformed country, a “human rights
state” intent on transforming itself into an example to other nations.265
The Constitutional Court evidently sees itself as the primary guardian
259. See, e.g., Eric C. Christiansen, Transformative Constitutionalism in South Africa:
Creative Uses of Constitutional Court Authority to Advance Substantive Justice, 13 J. GEN-
DER, RACE & JUST. 575, 576 (2010) [hereinafter Christiansen, Transformative
Constitutionalism].
260. See, e.g., Dennis Davis, The Case Against Inclusion of Socio-Economic Demands in
a Bill of Rights Except as Directive Principles, 8 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 475, 488– 89 (1992).
261. See Letter from Albie Sachs, supra note 43, at 224.
262. Many of the justices, especially the ANC members, had joined foreign law facul-
ties, human rights organizations, and NGOs, or had participated in meetings or interna-
tional conferences related to apartheid and human rights. See Judges, CONST. CT. S. AFR.,
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/formerjudges.htm (last visited Sept.
23, 2016) (providing biographies of current and former justices).
263. Arthur Chaskalson, C.J., Const. Ct. of S. Afr., Justice Chaskalson’s Farewell
Speech (June 2, 2005), http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/thecourt/farewell
.htm.
264. Id.
265. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, pmbl. (“We . . . adopt this Constitution . . . to . . .
establish a society based on . . . fundamental human rights.”).
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and expositor of the Constitution.266  It has been the “the key institution of
[South African] constitutional democracy.”267  From the time it was
founded and given the task of certifying the Constitution to its ongoing
charge of monitoring the lower judiciary and assessing the constitutional-
ity of all government actions, the Court has been at the center of South
Africa’s transition.  Even twenty years later, and after the death or retire-
ment of all of its original members, the Court’s review of current controver-
sies still encourages popular and legislative dialogue about the
Constitution’s commitment to progressive goals and it further advances its
reformist values.  It reminds all South Africans that the Constitution’s his-
toric promises remain relevant to present problems.  This reinforces the on-
going role of the Constitution’s values in present-day society.  In fact, rein-
forcing the values of the founding generation through their written judg-
ments remains a particularly important role of Constitutional Court
Justices, even two decades after the court’s initial decisions.
For example, with regard to progressive rights of equality for gays and
lesbians, which many people oppose on religious or other grounds, the
Court plays a critical role, reaffirming the commitments South Africans
made in the Constitution— even if those commitments are personally disfa-
vored.  Its legitimacy and authority allows the Court to assert expansive
equality as a core constitutional value in a manner that re-connects it to its
origins in non-racialism and the struggle against apartheid.
In part, the Constitutional Court’s successes have resulted from its
capacity to maintain and reinvigorate South Africa’s “constitutional
moment,” the period of expectancy and generosity at the end of apartheid
and the start of democratic constitutionalism.  The Court’s frequent refer-
ences to post-apartheid transformation and constitutional values support
its progressive and expansive rulings, reminding South Africans of a more
optimistic moment in time when the commitments were initially made.
Subject to necessary caveats related to the limited power of the judici-
ary to effect social change, the South African Constitutional Court has
inaugurated an impressive jurisprudence— substantive equality expressed
through robust anti-discrimination and the promotion of human dignity,
social welfare, and democratic participation— in service of the constitu-
tional purpose of transforming South Africa.  One obvious lesson of the
last twenty years is that progressive textual rights can advance social justice
and constitutional transformation, to a modest but beneficial extent, when
entrusted to an empowered and values-aligned judiciary.
266. History of the Court, CONST. CT. S. AFR., www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/
home.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2016); see also CONST. CT. S. AFR., www.constitution-
alcourt.org.za/site/home.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2016) (“[T]he 11 judges stand guard
over the Constitution and protect everyone’s human rights.”); Former Judges, CONST. CT.
S. AFR., http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/judges/formerjudges.htm (last vis-
ited Sept. 24, 2016).
267. History of the Court, supra note 266.
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B. Lessons for Advancement of Constitutional Equality
The South African Constitutional Court has employed several different
strategies for maximizing equality, including gay and lesbian equality.  As
discussed below, the justices use their reasoning and judgments to guide
official action by the other branches of government; they strengthen their
own authority by leveraging the legitimacy of the elected branches, the
ANC, and the anti-apartheid struggle; and they empower future plaintiffs
through their expansive assurances of broad-based equality under the
Constitution.
1. Guiding Official State Action
The Court’s gay and lesbian rights decisions have intentionally and
proactively pressured the executive and legislative branches to act consist-
ently with their constitutional duties.  In and of itself, this is unremarkable;
courts always have the role of executing this guidance function.  The role of
legal precedent has always been to inform state actors of the future likeli-
hood of particular legal results for relatively similar parties in relatively
similar situations.  But the South African Constitutional Court has gone
further.
The Court has encouraged the political branches to take specific
action that would advance substantive equality, occasionally chiding them
to do so.  The most obvious examples are the cases that preceded the mar-
riage equality decision in Fourie.  The Court rebuked Parliament for its fail-
ure to pass “comprehensive legislation” related to gay and lesbian family
law and marriage.  As multiple cases highlighted this deficiency between
1999 and 2003, the Court was no longer content with implying that Parlia-
ment should act.  In the last gay rights case before Fourie, the Court point-
edly declared that “[i]t is not appropriate for courts to determine [details of
laws implementing marriage equality] . . . .  Those are matters for the legis-
lature . . . .”268  When Parliament failed to act in a timely and concrete
manner, the Court focused the legislative task and required Parliament’s
action by ordering it to act on marriage equality or to have a judicial solu-
tion imposed on the nation within one year.269  The Court’s calculated use
of the text, history, and purpose of South Africa’s transformative Constitu-
tion ensured legislative cooperation in implementing gay and lesbian legal
equality.
Moreover, the Court’s decision to require a legislative remedy could be
understood to show that Parliament may not escape its constitutional
responsibilities through judicial resolution.  Not all forms of guidance are
as direct as the Court’s approach in Fourie.  Perhaps this is because the
other government branches are not typically as obstinate.  However, when
the other branches respond in an early and appropriate manner, by pass-
ing affirmative legislation or altering government practices, the changes
268. J and B v. Dir. Gen., Dep’t of Home Affairs & Others 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC) at
para. 26 (S. Afr.).
269. Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 98 para. 158 (S. Afr.).
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never appear in the case reports of the Constitutional Court.  Hence, the
overall effectiveness of this guidance function may be unknowable, even if
its importance is inarguable.  This is particularly true in a jurisprudential
area of ample and consistent judicial action, like the field of gay and les-
bian equality.
2. Leveraging Legitimacy
A second strategy of the Court focuses on maximizing the influence of
its decisions by bolstering its status and relative acceptance.  Stable consti-
tutionalism requires institutional and popular legitimacy for court judg-
ments.  This is particularly the case when a constitution seeks to “[h]eal
the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic val-
ues, social justice[,] and fundamental human rights.”270  Transformative
constitutionalism requires the Court to maximize its legitimacy whenever
possible.271  At the most general level, the Court’s consistent use of plain
language rather than specialist legal terminology promotes legitimacy by
making the Court’s reasoning more accessible.272  Similarly, the Court rou-
tinely issues very brief summaries of important cases, targeted at the
media.  These summaries support clear communication of the reasoning
and result of the Court’s judgment, with the aim of enhancing understand-
ing and support of its decisions.273
Fourie again provides a helpful example.274  The Court’s carefully cir-
cumscribed marriage equality order to Parliament275 leveraged the demo-
cratic authority of the National Assembly generally and the popularity of
the ANC specifically to bolster the desired result.276  The intended result
was electorally legitimized because it was democratically legislated with
support from the politically and culturally dominant ANC.  The Court, Par-
liament, and the ANC seemed aware of this motivation for assigning this
task to Parliament rather than merely remedying the injustice through judi-
cial fiat.277
270. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, pmbl.
271. Christiansen, Transformative Constitutionalism, supra note 259.
272. Frans Viljoen, Baring The Nation’s Soul Through Plain Language, 46 CLARITY 15,
15 (2001).
273. See, e.g., Satchwell v. The President and Another: Explanatory Note, S. AFR. LEGAL
INFO. INST., www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2002/18media.pdf (last visited Oct. 6,
2016); DuToit and Another v. The Minister For Welfare and Population Development and
Others: Explanatory Note, S. AFR. LEGAL INFO. INST., www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/
2002/20media.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2016).
274. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524 (CC) at 91– 94 paras. 148– 50 (S. Afr.).
275. Id. at 100– 01 para. 161.
276. Id. at 100 para. 160.
277. See, e.g., Home Affairs Portfolio Comm., Civil Union Bill, Film & Publications &
Immigration Amendment Bills: Briefing (Sept. 13, 2006), PARLIAMENTARY MONITORING
GROUP, www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20060912-civil-union-bill-films-publications-immigra-
tion-amendment-bills-briefing-department (discussing “the Fourie judgment [sic] which
had placed the Executive, Parliament as well as [the Legal Advisor’s] office under consid-
erable pressure to amend the legislation or to alternatively introduce separate legisla-
tion . . . .  [T]hey also very carefully studied all other Constitutional Court cases and
other relevant jurisprudence on the topic of same sex marriages.”).
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The marriage equality legislation that eventually passed278 could
claim greater political legitimacy, and the process of its passage prompted
discussion of gay rights issues popularly.  The Court had used its open-
ended remedial power to advance substantive equality through a process
that bolstered the socio-political elements of equality.  In this way, the
Court was able to reinforce the constitutional value of equality in a more
productive and potentially enduring manner than if it had merely invali-
dated the law or “read in” language to alter existing marriage laws.279
3. Inspiring Future Claims
The Court’s gay rights jurisprudence can inform future anti-discrimi-
nation and affirmative protection claims in at least two substantive ways.
First, it can provide a generous model for additional rights claims related to
sexual orientation and gender identity, extending the legal protections for
gays and lesbians to additional segments of the LGBTI community.  And
secondly, future advocates may seek court orders of a more affirmative
nature, requiring the government to satisfy its affirmative duties to
“respect, protect, promote[,] and fulfill”280 the constitutional promise of
equality.
It is unfortunate, however, that the Court has not spoken more sub-
stantively about the meaning and constitutional significance of sexual ori-
entation outside the application to gays and lesbians.  Additionally, it is
regrettable that the Court has not yet had occasion to significantly address
discrimination related to gender identity— especially because gender is a
distinctly protected category (in addition to sex) in the Equality Clause.281
The Court did adopt a working definition of sexual orientation in the
NCGLE Sodomy case: “[S]exual orientation is defined by reference to erotic
attraction: in the case of heterosexuals, to members of the opposite sex; in
the case of gays and lesbians, to members of the same sex.”282  Moreover,
the Court described the term “sexual orientation” in the Constitution as
“linguistically and textually fully capable of bearing” a “generous interpre-
tation.”283  The Court said that protections apply “equally to the orienta-
tion of persons who are bi-sexual, or transsexual and it also applies to the
278. See generally Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 (S. Afr.).
279. This was, unsurprisingly, the Court’s back-up plan. Fourie 2005 (1) SA 524
(CC) at 100– 01 para. 161 (S. Afr.) (“Should Parliament not correct the defects within
this period, Section 30(1) of the Marriage Act 25 of 1961 will forthwith be read as
including the words ‘or spouse’ after the words ‘or husband’ as they appear in the mar-
riage formula.”).
280. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 7.
281. Id. § 9(3).
282. Nat’l Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1)
SA 6 (CC) at para. 20 (S. Afr.) [hereinafter NCGLE Sodomy] (citing the highly influential
work, Cameron, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution, supra note 42).  In a hopeful
sign for future jurisprudence, Professor Cameron was appointed to the Constitutional
Court in 2009.  He was the first openly gay and HIV-positive justice.  Chip Alfred, Bear-
ing Witness, ART & UNDERSTANDING MAG. (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.aumag.org/2011/
12/10/bearing-witness/.
283. NCGLE Sodomy 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) at para. 21 (S. Afr.).
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orientation of persons who might on a single occasion only be erotically
attracted to a member of their own sex.”284  However, the Court has had
little to say about the larger context of sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity since that case.  Hopefully, when appropriate cases arrive, the Court’s
treatment of discrimination on the basis of homosexuality will model an
expansive, dignity-focused approach to issues related to other forms of sex-
ual orientation as well as to gender identity.
The Court’s announcement of a constitutional requirement for “mean-
ingful engagement” in the housing rights case Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road
v. City of Johannesburg also has the potential to support substantive equality
in future cases.285  In Olivia Road, the Court required the state to present
evidence of good faith consultation with impacted individuals and con-
cerned civil society organizations as a prerequisite to asserting that the
state response was constitutionally adequate.286  Consequently, affected
communities are significantly empowered to advocate for their own
rights— particularly in the face of plausible claims of government inaction
or indifference.  In the context of gay and lesbian rights, this meaningful
interaction requirement opens an additional avenue for organizing and
engaging with the state related to the crisis of corrective rape (or other
extant equality issues).  If particularly affected communities— in this case
township lesbians and others— are consulted, there is a far greater likeli-
hood of improved outcomes, i.e., practicable strategies for greater safety
and security, more effective prosecutions, and community educational pro-
grams to advance understanding and social acceptance
Such a result would likely lead to significantly improved outcomes for
LGBT community stakeholders and might also increase popular involve-
ment with government and educate the state bureaucracy about ground-
level discrimination issues.  If the meaningful engagement requirement
spreads from socio-economic rights to the field of equality or other catego-
ries of constitutional rights, the occurrence of good faith community con-
sultation in one substantive area will raise expectations and facilitate
improved outcomes in other areas.
Such a development is consistent with the transformational value of
substantive equality in the South African Constitution.  Equality in the
modern South African constitutional tradition is not merely a prohibition
on discriminatory government action— American style “negative liber-
284. Id.  While the expansive references to issues not before the Court in the Sodomy
case are important for later jurisprudential developments, there seems to be some con-
flation of gender identity issues (“transsexual”) with sexual orientation issues (“bi-sex-
ual” and earlier references in the case to heterosexuality and homosexuality). See id.
285. Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Twp. and 197 Main St. Johannesburg v City of
Johannesburg & Others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) at 7– 13 paras. 9, 18 (S. Afr.).
286. The Court not only asserts an expectation that public disclosure and consulta-
tion will actually occur but also issues orders with real consequences when it does not.
Id. at 10– 13 paras. 14– 18 (“Engagement is a two-way process in which the City and
those about to become homeless would talk to each other meaningfully in order to
achieve certain objectives.  There is no closed list of the objectives of engagement.”).  The
Court not only asserted an expectation that public disclosure and consultation will
actually occur, but also issued orders with real consequences when it does not. Id.
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ties.”287  Rather, it is a constitutional goal with civil, political, and social
welfare dimensions.  As a consequence, judicial tools that advance any area
of equality, like “meaningful engagement” to address socio-economic ine-
quality, would appropriately be used to support more traditional dimen-
sions of equality.  When reviewed comparatively by other nations’ courts,
this process will offer a viable example of a creative use of judicial power to
promote equality.
C. Lessons for Comparative Equality and Constitutionalism
The South African Constitution is a well-respected model for other
countries and future constitutions.  And, to the extent it guides content
choices for future constitutional drafters and models rights adjudication
for foreign courts, the Court’s interpretation and application of the Consti-
tution, amplifies its influence.  Indeed, as a result of the Constitution’s
unique history, the document is viewed with great respect by members of
the international community, and has been described by one commentator
as one of the “newer, sexier[,] and more powerful operating systems in the
constitutional marketplace.”288  Even internationally known jurists have
affirmed its particular strengths.  United States Supreme Court Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsberg recently encouraged Egypt to look to the model of the
South African Bill of Rights as an exemplar for its new constitution.289  It
shines a favorable light on South Africa as a whole; “South Africa’s pro-
human rights constitution, stable government, democratic institutions,
independent judiciary, and strong economy mean it has great potential to
become a global human rights leader.”290
This makes the constitutional provisions (and their interpretation)
even more important in comparative context; the South African Constitu-
tion is worthy of consideration as an example for burgeoning democracies.
Since 1994, it has been noted by other countries that South Africa chose to
include express protections based on sexual orientation in its Constitu-
tion.291  This decision by the drafters has had an impact far beyond the
287. In one famous iteration of this notion, American Judge Richard Posner stated:
[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties . . . .  The
men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do
too little for the people but that it might do too much to them.  The Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted in 1868 at the height of laissez-faire thinking, sought to
protect Americans from oppression by state government, not to secure them
basic governmental services.
Jackson v. Jolliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (1983) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
322 (1980) (“The guarantee of equal protection under the Fifth Amendment is not a
source of substantive rights or liberties, but rather a right to be free from invidious
discrimination in statutory classifications and other governmental activity.”)).
288. Adam Liptak, ‘We the People’ Loses Appeal with People Around the World, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, at A1, www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/us/we-the-people-loses-
appeal-with-people-around-the-world.html.
289. Id.
290. World Report 2011: South Africa Annual Country Report, HUM. RTS. WATCH, www
.hrw.org/world-report-2011/south-africa (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
291. See, e.g., Jill Cottrell & Yash Ghai, Constitution Making in Fiji: Context and Pro-
cess, in THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTION-BUILDING PROCESS IN DEMOCRATIZATION 1, 16 (2004),
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country’s borders.  The effective creation of a new, default list of categories
for Equality Clause protection, which includes sexual orientation, does not
ensure that future nations will adopt the protections but it may fundamen-
tally alter the presumptive text of equality provisions as future constitu-
tions are drafted.  The impact of the Constitution’s expansive rights
protections is magnified because the Constitutional Court has applied the
provision extensively.
The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence is also a model for other
nations.  Its international and comparative influence highlights the signifi-
cance of the Court’s affirmative gay rights jurisprudence.  Because the
South African Constitutional Court has interpreted the first sexual orienta-
tion protections to appear in a national constitution, its treatment of inclu-
sive equality provisions is also inescapably important.  Was it to be a full,
substantive right worthy of adjudication and protection or merely window
dressing with no legal impact?292  The Court’s unanimous, affirmative rul-
ings advancing each of the adjudicated elements of gay and lesbian equal-
ity have answered that question decisively.  The South African
Constitutional Court, drawing on a greatly respected constitution and con-
sidering international and comparative law in its decisions, robustly pro-
tects the equality of gays and lesbians and affirms their fundamental
equality and human dignity.
Because the judgments come from the South African Constitutional
Court, they are more likely to be noticed by other nations’ courts and they
may more easily join the comparative law conversation about human rights
adjudication.  The expansive case law prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation is of singular importance in comparative context— par-
ticularly at this time when a significant number of courts are adjudicating
and, with legislators, debating issues of gay and lesbian equality.  The
South African Court has always seen itself as part of a global conversation
about constitutional values and constitutionalism.  When the Court speaks
about equality and gay rights in its cases, it not only speaks to an attentive
international audience but also from a unique depth of experience.
http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/cbp_fiji.pdf (“[A]pparently, in possession of the
South African constitution, they managed to sneak in an idea or two of their own.  It
seems that the inclusion of sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination
comes from the drafters; certainly it is not in the [report of the original constitutional
negotiating body].”).
292. The lesson of Fijian constitutionalism is relevant here as well.  The short-lived
Fijian Constitution of 1997 (the second constitution in the world to include express
protections based on sexual orientation) and the most recent iteration, the Fijian Consti-
tution of 2013, both included sexual orientation (and gender identity) in their equality
clauses but made special exceptions related to marriage, adoption, and other areas of
family law. See CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF FIJI § 26. See generally Fiji: Revise Draft Con-
stitution to Protect Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 4, 2013), www.hrw.org/news/2013/
09/04/fiji-revise-draft-constitution-protect-rights.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-3\CIN302.txt unknown Seq: 50 13-APR-17 15:43
614 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 49
Conclusion
It is appropriate and valuable to critically examine the significance
and achievements of the constitution that ended South African apartheid
twenty years ago.  Among the successes of the South African Constitution
is its novel, progressive inclusion of equality protections for gays and lesbi-
ans.  The prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation was
particularly important because it occurred in this historic human rights
constitution.  Moreover, the ensuing gay rights jurisprudence of the South
African Constitutional Court is the most protective in the world.  The Con-
stitutional Court’s opinions include express affirmations of the dignity
and equality of gays and lesbians in an unbroken series of unanimous, pro-
gay decisions that form a substantial core of the overall equality jurispru-
dence of the Court.  In particular, three defining characteristics facilitated
adjudicatory success related to gay and lesbian rights: a protective constitu-
tional text, a progressive Constitutional Court, and an effective litigation
strategy.
Nevertheless, South African gays and lesbians are currently facing the
daunting challenge of leveraging legal victories into broader, societal equal-
ity.  Twenty years after the prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination
in the Equality Clause of the South African Constitution, the protections’
practical effects have been woefully inadequate to achieve the safety and
social equality of gays and lesbians in South Africa.  In sharp contrast to
the expansive textual protections and progressive jurisprudence, the lived
reality of South Africans gays and lesbians, particularly in poorer commu-
nities, is typified by condemnation, discrimination and homophobic vio-
lence.  Hence, the Equality Clause protections are a symbol of both the
progressive human rights reach of the post-apartheid Constitution and the
gulf between textual promises and reality.
Moreover, there are risks ahead that highlight the critical need for
broader public support.  Judicial action is relatively insecure; it is subject to
legislative revision, constitutional amendment, and executive inaction.
Change through judicial rulings without popular affirmation may be fleet-
ing, ineffective, or merely symbolic.  And, more than at any other point in
the last two decades, there is uncertainty about the road ahead for South
Africa.  With open questions of party discipline and frequent allegations of
abuse of political power, the stakes are much higher for the extra-legal,
social equality side of the struggle for gay and lesbian equality in South
Africa.  Without changes in public opinion, the steady legal gains of the
last two decades are threatened by the potential for constitutional amend-
ment (relatively easy under the current make-up of Parliament)293 or a
293. The Constitution can be amended relatively easily by the two houses of Parlia-
ment. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 74(2) (“[The Bill of Rights] may be amended by a Bill
passed by (a) the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its
members; and (b) the National Council of Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least
six provinces . . . .”).  Following the 2014 elections, the ANC held 249 of 400 seats
(62.15%) of the National Assembly. 2014 National and Provincial Election Results, ELEC-
TORAL COMM. S. AFR., http://www.elections.org.za/resultsnpe2014/ (last visited Mar. 31,
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populist, conservative turn by a weakened ANC seeking to maintain politi-
cal dominance.
In this Article, I have examined the Constitution’s drafting history, the
Constitutional Court’s gay rights jurisprudence, and the practical insuffi-
ciencies of the Constitution’s inclusion of sexual orientation-based protec-
tions.  I have done so in order to highlight three insights about the last two
decades of constitutional rights in South Africa: an encouraging insight
about novel and progressive elements in the drafting of modern constitu-
tions, several modest claims about the capacity for courts to combat ine-
quality based on sexual orientation despite the limitations of purely legal
victories, and a hopeful affirmation of the value of even unrealized consti-
tutional aspirations for the fields of comparative constitutionalism and gay
and lesbian equality.
The inclusion of sexual orientation protections in the constitution that
ended apartheid in South Africa stands as a figurative marker at the begin-
ning of the modern, constitutional era for equality for gay men and lesbi-
ans.  Its legal significance is singular and substantial.  But it can only
support social equality, not achieve it.  The legal protections themselves
require a powerful Court, a stable political sphere, and durable, wide-
spread trust in South Africa’s transformative constitutional values.
2015).  The ANC also held sixty of ninety seats on the National Council of Provinces
(with a majority of seats in seven of the nine provinces). Members of Parliament, PARLIA-
MENTARY MONITORING GROUP, https://pmg.org.za/members/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2015).
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